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Abstract
Research into the established area of Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS) is still evolving and fast-moving fuelled in part by rapid changes
in vehicular technologies and mobile communication network. A prac-
tical challenge is that many vehicular communication applications and
services make use of the Basic Safety Messages that contain the vehicle
location and other personal data. A popular way of dealing with this
privacy issue is to utilise a pseudonym change scheme to protect the ve-
hicle’s identity and location. However, many such schemes suffer from
poor scalability and the certificate management difficulty raises with the
number of pseudonyms generated and stored in the ITS system, casting
doubt of the economic feasibility of such approaches.
In this thesis, firstly, Cooperative Pseudonym Change Scheme (CPCS)
for VCS is proposed for providing high level of anonymity. In this model,
the Road Side Units (RSUs) are the key factor by storing generated pseudonym
sets from the Trusted Authority (TA), then delivering sets of pseudonyms
to vehicles which has similar context. Secondly a Decentralised Pseudonym
Management System (DPMS) Using Distributed Ledger Technology is
proposed to overcome low scalability and high cost of managing large
numbers of pseudonym certificates in ITS. This scheme consists of pseudonym
distribution and a shuffle operation, allowing the re-distribution and re-
usage of existing pseudonyms by different vehicles. The results demon-
strate that the proposed scheme achieves a better degree of anonymity
iii
and low request delay at a lower cost than existing schemes. Thirdly, a
Distributed Pseudonym Certificate Revocation Scheme (DPCRS) for VCS
is proposed based on the framework that DPMS introduced. The pro-
posed scheme embeds part of the certificate revocation functions within
the security and privacy applications, to reduce the communication over-
head and shorten the processing time. Extensive simulations and analy-
sis show the effectiveness and efficiency of the three proposed schemes.
iv
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber-physical system (CPS) could be considered as one of the most
promising techniques to help people live a better life. One of the most
attractive CPS cases is the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), as de-
noted as the Transportation-based Cyber-Physical System. The combina-
tion of vehicle and network communication technologies has pushed the
boundary of next generation connected vehicles. This exerts pressure on
car manufacturers to offer innovative products and services in that space.
While the connected vehicle and roadside infrastructure are physical en-
tities, the Vehicular Communication System (VCS) is a network platform
that provides Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
communications. With the help of the development of distributed com-
puting infrastructures for CPS, the vehicle becomes a platform capable
of receiving information from its peers and the environment, generating
its own data, such as driver behaviour and car state, and transmitting
data to other vehicles, roadside infrastructure, or third parties in order to
improve road safety, pollution control, insurance information and traffic
efficiency.
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In addition, the Internet of Things (IoT) technology is driving tra-
ditional VCS research and development towards the Internet of Vehi-
cles (IoV) [1]. Applications in IoV rely on the exchange of basic safety
messages. The message is called Basic Safety Messages (BSMs), which
contains vehicle status information such as location, speed, and vehicle
dimension [2] in US IEEE standard, while EU ETSI standards have sim-
ilar messages called Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAM). Due to
the fact that many applications and services make use of BSM – which
contains vehicle identity, location and other personal data – VCS faces
the risk of not only disclosing sensitive information about vehicles and
drivers, but also manipulating of identity and location information.
This chapter introduces the work carried out in the thesis. The re-
search motivation is presented to state the necessity of the pseudonym
management research in Vehicular Management Systems (VCS). Then,
contributions of this thesis are illustrated. Lastly, the structure of the the-
sis is introduced.
1.1 Research Motivation
The state-of-the-art schemes introduce pseudonym and pseudonym cer-
tificate to protect VCS security and privacy [3]. Vehicles carry a set of
pseudonyms which are used under different time periods in VCS com-
munication. The safety beacon messages are sent using pseudonym cer-
tificates, instead of the long-term vehicle id (VID) which issued by a
certificate authority (CA) [4]. The pseudonym set contains pseudonym
ID, pseudonym certificate and the corresponding key pairs. The vehi-
cle signs the beacon message with pseudonym private key, attaches the
pseudonym certificate and sends out the beacon message. Some studies
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that focus on vehicles themselves changing pseudonyms suggest that ve-
hicles would be loaded with a substantial number of pseudonyms at reg-
istration stage, and would swap their pseudonyms amongst each other[5].
Such an approach would cause extra bandwidth overheads, since band-
width is already taken up by network traffic. Some approaches propose
a method of using RSUs to assist in distributing pseudonyms consis-
tently in order to resolve this overhead issue [6]. However, there still
could be a problem that the pool of new pseudonym sets for each RSU
could be drained empty as RSUs need to keep providing new sets for
vehicles driving through their coverage area. In some schemes, PKIs are
designed to generate adequate new pseudonyms and then deliver them
to the RSUs that run out of pseudonyms [7]. However, this does not
scale as a large number of vehicle nodes within the entire VCS environ-
ment requires a large number of pseudonyms. Moreover, the lack of a
pseudonym recycle mechanism could cause high cost system manage-
ment.
Since existing schemes neither consider the cost of pseudonym gener-
ation nor the impact that may result from the generation of a large num-
ber of one-time use pseudonyms, this research work aims to propose
pseudonym and certificate management schemes that could overcome
above issues.
1.2 Research Objectives
This research work aims to establish a novel privacy preservation tech-
niques for pseudonym certificate management in a large volume of VCS
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participants. In literature, the current pseudonym certificate manage-
ment can offer acceptable level of privacy, but at the expense of the net-
work management efficiency and network overheads. These two impor-
tant factors are major difficulties of pseudonym certificate management
research. Hence this thesis aims to propose a pseudonym certificate man-
agement scheme that provides a solution to address above issues. The
objectives of this thesis are presented as follow:
• A comprehensive study of VCS, its characteristics and differences
in US and EU standards.
• The cooperative pseudonym change scheme could improve the level
of anonymity compared to the existing privacy preservation schemes.
• The pseudonym management scheme should be able to manage
pseudonyms and related certificates over large scale vehicular net-
works and minimise the number of pseudonym certificates stored
in the vehicles and infrastructures.
• The distributed pseudonym certificate revocation scheme should
be able to decrease the communication overhead and processing
time in terms of broadcasting certificate revocation list from public
key infrastructure.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
Three contributions are made in the thesis. Since the research focuses on
solving the issues of using pseudonym certificates, a brief pseudonym
lifecycle is shown in figure 1.1. Pseudonym certificates are generated
by Issuing Authority, and pass along to vehicles for covering their real
identities during V2X communication. Used pseudonyms are uploaded
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back to authorities for reuse and management. Public key infrastructure
not only manages the mapping of vehicle long term identity and short
term pseudonym relation, but also has the power to revoke pseudonym
certificates from adversaries. Contributions are made by different stages
of pseudonym lifecycle, which are detailed as follows:
FIGURE 1.1: A Brief Pseudonym Lifecycle
1. A cooperative pseudonym change scheme for VCS network is pro-
posed. By combining periodically change pseudonym and RSU as-
sisting pseudonym change in the mix zone, the proposed scheme
not only increases the level of anonymity but also suits multiple
scenarios, e.g. highway straight lanes and city based crossroads
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case. The proposed scheme can achieve nearly 20 % more anonymity
set size in light traffic congestions compared with the benchmark.
Since the vehicle level pseudonym changing scheme was covered
in the first contribution, the improvement of infrastructure level in
VCS network is in the next contribution.
2. A pseudonym Management scheme by using blockchain technol-
ogy is proposed. The pseudonym certificate shuffling mechanism is
a new location privacy preservation pseudonym management ap-
proach for VCS, which reduces pseudonym generation and man-
agement cost. A decentralised privacy manager (PM) is introduced
in the system. The PM aims to alleviate the computation burden
on RSUs and to improve the robustness of the network. The total
pseudonym usage for 3 days of the proposed scheme could save
nearly 90 % compared with ESTI recommended standards.
3. As the follow up of the pseudonym shuffling scheme, a distributed
framework for providing efficient certificate revocation service to
revoke pseudonym certificates from malicious users is proposed.
The proposed scheme embeds part of the certificate revocation func-
tions within the security and privacy applications, aiming to reduce
the communication overhead and shorten the processing time cost.
1.4 List of Publications
1.4.1 Journals
1. S. Bao, Y. Cao, A. Lei, P. Asuquo, H. Cruickshank, Z. Sun, and
M. Huth, "Pseudonym Management Through Blockchain: Cost-
Efficient Privacy Preservation on Intelligent Transportation Systems,"
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2. A. Lei, Y. Cao, S. Bao, D. Li, P. Asuquo, H. Cruickshank, and Z.
Sun, "A blockchain based certificate revocation scheme for vehic-
ular communication systems," Future Generation Computer Systems
(2019), In Press, Corrected Proof, Available online 5 April 2019.
3. S. Bao, W. Hathal, H. Cruickshank, Z. Sun, P. Asuquo, and A. Lei,
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no. 6, pp. 4778-4802, Dec. 2018.
1.4.2 Conferences
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1. A. Lei, Y. Cao, S. Bao, P. Asuquo, H. Cruickshank, and Z. Sun,
"Blockchain-based Dynamic Key Management for IoT-Transportation
Security Protection," Blockchain for Distributed Systems Security (2019):
117.
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 and 3 introduce the background and related literature re-
view of ITS environment and VCS networks. The background of VCS
and ITS includes the relationship between ITS and VCS, core technolo-
gies for VCS and general security standards. The related literature re-
view shows the privacy challenges in ITS, VCS-based privacy preserving
technologies, the cutting-edge distributed ledger technology and privacy
metrics. In Chapter 4, a cooperative pseudonym change scheme is pro-
posed for VCS networks. Chapter 5 presents a pseudonym management
scheme using blockchain to reuse pseudonyms. In Chapter 6, an exten-
sion work of previous pseudonym management scheme is carried out to
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efficiently revoke pseudonym certificates. Chapter 7 concludes the the-
sis and proposes possible future research plan in the VCS security and
privacy field.
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Chapter 2
Background of ITS and VCS
2.1 Technologies in Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tems
The concept of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) has been proposed
for nearly 80 years. Since 80 years ago, scholars and researchers already
came up with the idea of remote control highways and even communica-
tions between vehicles themselves to make transportation systems both
efficient and safe [8]. Due to the limitation of technology at that time,
these ideas found hard to become reality and even the essential facilities
to make the ITS come true has not been invented yet. Even though the
dream of smart transportation did not come true, car to car communica-
tion and information exchange between all road users were accepted.
Back to 1980s, Volkswagen introduced the Wolfsburger Welle [9] which
is a Green Light Optimal Speed Advisory (GLOSA) system. When in-
frared communication technology was used for processing guidance in-
formation [10], a field trial used infrastructure to transmit current traf-
fic to road users and even gave them alternative routes through infrared
beacons. Despite many benefits from these projects, the technical difficul-
ties, high initial investment and low acceptance caused the cancellation
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of these projects.
2.1.1 Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs)
The Vehicular ad-hoc Network (VANET) has been introduced since 1980s
[11]. The VANET concept is based on the Mobile ad-hoc Network (MANET).
The 5.85 GHz spectrum has been allocated for DSRC by both the U.S.
FCC and the European ECC. In this band, IEEE and ETSI reserved a cer-
tain amount of 10 MHZ channels for different intelligent transportation
systems applications. In US, the spectrum has been allocated from 5.85
to 5.925 GHz and divided into seven 10 MHz channels with a 5 MHz
guard band at the low end. There is one control channel (CCH) as a spe-
cial “rendezvous” channel that all the devices will attend on a regular
basis [2]. All the rest channels in the band were designated as service
channels (SCH). While the control channel is designed for broadcasting
status information of vehicles (speed, direction and position) and emer-
gency messages, service channels are mainly used for all the rest traffic
services.
The ad-hoc VCS communication systems rely on these channels in
both America and Europe. In America, they call the system as IEEE
WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments), while the system
in EU was designated as ETSI ITS-G5 [12]. The system can be seen in a
way of multiple protocols defining the operation process from physical to
application layer. When it comes to security and management perspec-
tives, cross-layer combination even contains most layer in the system.
Although both systems have similar physical layer which is the aim of
the Harmonisation task group [2], there are lots of differences from MAC
layer to upper layer. Since the early 2000s, a great amount of studies and
industrial projects in the context of vehicular networks rose dramatically
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[13] as the new technologies of cellular networks such as Universal Mo-
bile Telecommunications Service (UMTS) and LTE provide more reliable
and faster communication. Moreover, using IEEE 802.11p [2] created the
possibility of exchanging messages in an infrastructure-less way. There
is an example of the idea about Wolfsburger Welle, that now based on
IEEE802.11p ad-hoc 5.9GHz WLAN communication.
FIGURE 2.1: The classification of vehicular network ap-
plications
The figure 2.1 states that a taxonomy of vehicular network applica-
tions based on [14]. The purpose of an application defined it is supposed
to use whether ad-hoc network or cellular network. In general, safety
applications use ad-hoc network because dealing with road safety and
emergency must react as quick as possible or even ahead, while other ap-
plications might choose cellular network for obtain various benefits like
traffic guidance. Vehicles do not only rely on neighbour vehicles, but
also could use their internet connection to enjoy various convenience. In
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terms of safety and awareness applications, the primary aims are pre-
venting from collisions and saving the life of road users. Both safety and
awareness applications are time critical and local, so that IEEE 802.11p
ad-hoc communication which designed for short range frequent data ex-
change could suit the needs. The IEEE 802.11p is referred as Dedicated
Short-Range Communication and in, that standardised in USA and Eu-
rope [2], [4], [15]. Moreover, the corresponding network is called Vehic-
ular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET). As the main feature of VANET is peri-
odically ad-hoc communication that brings about a huge discussion for
privacy issues, the privacy in the VANET would be the primary focus in
this thesis.
2.1.2 VCS Infrastructures and Components
The vehicular communication system has been classified into three cate-
gories, namely mobile communication devices, VCS infrastructures and
VCS authorities. The mobile communication devices are the vehicles
with wireless communication capability, which are located at the bottom
of the VCS network structure. The VCS infrastructures are basic frame-
work in the system, which are located in the middle of the network struc-
ture. The VCS authorities is the network manager, which are located on
top of the architecture.
The mobile communication devices is also known as On-Board Unit
(OBU), which is the wireless communication module that can be imple-
mented in the vehicle. The OBU is able to transmit, receive, process and
relay VCS messages. Extra features such as storing cryptography materi-
als, verifying messages, and sending encrypted messages are also added
into OBU to meet the security and privacy requirements for VCS appli-
cations.
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The VCS infrastructure refer to the Roadside infrastructure, aims to
be the basic access point at the roadside and relay functions between the
VCS backbone networks and OBUs. The roadside infrastructure is also
known as Road-side Unit (RSU). In the IEEE 802.11[16], the standard rec-
ommends to place the roadside infrastructure along the road at regular
intervals to maintain reasonable coverage. In the system of LTE-V proto-
col stack, the existing LTE base stations are used to cover VCS networks.
Since these LTE base stations are responsible for pr providing the basic
access point service, they are also called RSUs.
The VCS authorities aim to manage the VCS network. There are two
aspects are taken into account, namely, VCS self-management and appli-
cation management. The self-management includes the identity of the
mobile nodes, cryptography materials and the communication perfor-
mance of the VCS. The identity and cryptography materials are managed
by the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In VCS, PKI is normally man-
aged by the governmental organisations and departments which are in
charge of the transportation system, such as the Department of Transport.
Some research combines the PKI and Central Authorities (CA) as one
infrastructure named Central Manager (CM) [17]. The most of security
functions from PKI are based on the cooperation of CA and Anonymity
Server (AS). CA is for certificates generation, which provides the autho-
rised link between public/private key pairs and vehicle unique identifier.
The responsibility of AS is to generate pseudonym certificates (includes
pseudonym ID, corresponding key pairs and certificates) and to link be-
tween pseudonym and vehicle identifier. Application management is
used to schedule application messages between third-party application
server and VCS. The third-party application servers are placed outside
of the VCS and under the management of third-party service provide.
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The VCS authorities are only responsible for hiding the privacy-related
information.
2.1.3 Periodic Safety Messages in VCS
It is crucial to deliver road information in time to achieve the basic func-
tion of ITS. Therefore the safety related messages are considered as the
most important messages. Standardisation organisations considered safety
related message into the VCS protocol stacks. ETSI, IEEE and SAE pro-
posed various versions of safety related messages.
The US standard DSRC was the first standard proposed the safety
related messages, as know as, basic safety messages (BSM). BSMs are
designated for this certain type of message and are standardised in [18].
The protocol defines the concept of communication packets called WAVE
short messages (WSMs). It also defines the format of WSMs. A valid BSM
not only include basic information, but also could contain its GPS coordi-
nation, the elevation, and an indication whether the vehicle is changing
the lane or braking. The CCH is used for carry these messages with a
default frequency at 10 Hz. Safety applications of vehicle, such as col-
lision avoidance or headway warning, could use these messages receiv-
ing from other vehicles as an input. The beacon message is design for
transmitting vehicle’s status to its neighbour, that includes current po-
sition, speed, heading, etc. SAE protocols specifies the details of BSM.
SAE J2735 [19] illustrates the message sets including BSM. The details of
BSM in mandatory part is shown in figure 2.1. Additional requirements
of BSM are defined in [20] to finalise the BSM. The additional require-
ments target on the data trustworthiness and network performance. BSM
transmission power and rate are required to maintain the network per-
formance. In addition, security and privacy schemes are recommended
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TABLE 2.1: The Mandatory Payload for BSM
Basic Safety Message
Mandatory
ID and Timestamp
Position / Motion
Brake Status
Steering Status
Throttle Status
Exterior Light Status
Vehicle Size
to achieve trustworthiness.
C-ITS is EU-based standard stack. There are two messages defined
by ETSI, namely, Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) [15] and De-
centralised Environmental Notification Messages (DENMs) [21]. They
both use ITS Packet Data Unit (PDU) header to define message type and
sender address. Similar to BSM, CAM is the single hop safety message
which would be broadcast to surrounding nodes about vehicle status of
sender.
2.2 Security Standards in VCS
2.2.1 IEEE WAVE
The IEEE WAVE protocol stack can be seen from figure 2.2, that shows
it mainly consists of the IEEE 1609 family of standards accompanied and
extended by different IEEE, SAE and IETF documents. The channel ac-
cess is controlled by IEEE 802.11p plus IEEE 1609.4, that manages SCH
and CCH coordination. Applications which based on either IPv6 or the
Wave Short Message Protocol (WSMP) are both supported by this stack.
In addition, management and security features are cross-layer mecha-
nisms. As this report focuses on the simulation-based evaluation of pri-
vacy enhancing technologies in vehicular networks, relevant standards
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FIGURE 2.2: IEEE WAVE protocol stack
are defined in below:
• IEEE 802.11p - Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific re-
quirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC)
and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications Amendment 6: Wireless
Access in Vehicular Environments [22]: The standard will be the
foundation for vehicle connecting, as it directly affects the trans-
mission of messages and so that there is the possibility to overhear
communication and violate users’ privacy.
• IEEE1609.2 - Security Services for Applications and Management
Messages [4]: This standard defines security and privacy measures
in WAVE. And in section 2.2, there are few shortcomings of this
standard shown.
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• SAE J2945.1-2.2 - DSRC Message Communication Minimum Per-
formance Requirements: Basic Safety Message for Vehicle Safety
Applications [20]: This documents identified the periodic transmis-
sion of safety beacons. These beacons contain positions and ID in-
formation and therefore they are supposed to be encrypted. Thus,
the beacon message has a huge impact on the location privacy of
drivers because their potential identifying information includes in
every beacon.
2.2.2 ETSI ITS-G5
FIGURE 2.3: ETSI ITS-G5 protocol stack
A simplified example of ETSI ITS-G5 stack was shown in figure 2.3.
The stack illustrates that ITS-G5 uses IEEE 802.11p for channel access at
its physical and MAC layer, and puts IEEE 802.2 link layer control above
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the channel access as similar structure as IEEE WAVE. Instead of hav-
ing IEEE 802.11p and IEEE 1609.4 both for the MAC layer, ITS-G5 only
utilises IEEE 802.11p to control lower layers. While IEEE WAVE and ITS-
G5 have similar network and transport layers, ITS-G5 adds facilities layer
for the most important messages types (e.g., cooperative awareness mes-
sage, decentralised environmental notification message, signal phase and
timing message, and road topology message). In terms of management
and security, ITS-G5 introduced a new cross-layer mechanism which is
designated as Decentralised Congestion Control (DCC). Because of the
significant impact of DCC on the channel access and message generation,
this cross-layer mechanism made the main difference than IEEE WAVE.
For my purpose of research, the following documents of the ETSI ITS-G5
family of standards have been reviewed:
• ETSI 102731 - v1.1.1 - Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security;
Security Services and Architecture [23]: This standard specifies a
cross-layer mechanism mainly for providing secure and reliable
communication in vehicular networks. It is the basis of all follow-
ing security and privacy ETSI standards.
• ETSI 102893 - v1.1.1 - Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security;
Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis (TVRA) [24]: The docu-
ments states goals and challenges that security and privacy mecha-
nisms will face.
• ETSI 102940 - v1.1.1 - Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Secu-
rity; ITS communications security architecture and security man-
agement [25]: This standard aims at identifying the required security-
related entities. It also lists security parameters for certificate man-
agement and other Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) processes.
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• ETSI 102941 - v1.1.1 - Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security;
Trust and Privacy Management [26]: This standard can be seen as
the counterpart to IEEE 1609.2 of European standard. The PKI of
ITS-G5 including certificate enrolment and pseudonyms communi-
cation is described.
• ETSI 302637-2 - v1.3.2 - Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehic-
ular Communications; Basic Set of Applications; Part 2: Specifica-
tion of Cooperative Awareness Basic Service [27]: This standard,
like SAE J2945.1-2.2 in WAVE, defines the periodic broadcasting of
vehicle status information.
• ETSI 102687 - v1.2.1 - Intelligent Transport Systems(ITS); Decen-
tralised Congestion Control Mechanisms for Intelligent Transport
Systems operating in the 5 GHz range; Access layer part [28]: This
document describes the DCC (Decentralised Congestion Control)
mechanism which controls channel access of all vehicles.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, the overview of the characteristics that related to the the-
sis topic is illustrated. The sequence of the characteristics is organised
from macro to micro. The background of Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tem (ITS) is introduced in the first place, aiming to draw an outline of the
entire system. Communication techniques and protocols of the Vehicular
Communication System (VCS) take the second place. US and Europe
both came up with standards using 5.85 GHZ spectrum for vehicular
communications. Among various applications, the safety message is one
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of the most crucial applications as the purpose of vehicular communica-
tion focuses on providing more safety protection on the road. Further-
more, the components and infrastructures of VCS have been introduced.
Central authority, roadside infrastructure and vehicle one board unit are
three most important components. Periodic safety message is used for
vehicle to vehicle, and vehicle to infrastructure. Due to the nature of
this periodical broadcast message, it leads to several security and pri-
vacy challenges. Finally, both EU ETSI-ITS G5 and US IEEE WAVE stan-
dards provide many security and privacy related protocols . In the next
Chapter, the more detailed security and privacy preserving techniques
are introduced.
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Chapter 3
Privacy in Intelligent
Transportation Systems
3.1 General Privacy Challenges in ITS
Despite the promises of VANET, researchers believe that vehicular net-
works will face huge challenges of privacy and security that might hin-
der the development of vehicular networks by users [29], [30]. Recently,
revelations states that governmental programs globally collect, store, and
analyse private data. Due to the broadcast feature of periodic message,
many of these privacy violations are conducted by eavesdropping on
communication networks. In addition, the vehicular communication deeply
needs personal data including vehicular identity, position and direction.
Even though it gives users plenty of benefits not only safety also enter-
tainment, the privacy of vehicular networks has caused a massive con-
cern. Malicious ownership of private data could allow attackers easily
to explore individuals and to have the possibility to hack them. How-
ever, the trends indicate the future technology, which not only in VANET
also in cloud services, is going to heavily rely on high degrees of inter-
connectivity, and analysing personal behave to provide more accurate
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customised services. The authors from [31] state that people and compa-
nies tend to abuse personal data once they can get benefits from them.
Such lack of privacy and sense of security deter individuals, especially
drivers, from participating in this vehicular networks. As the vehicle is
the crucial part of VCS, the development of vehicular networks will face
obstruction without support from drivers. Therefore, providing reliable,
secure and private network service is extremely necessary.
3.1.1 Overview of Privacy Issues
In the vehicular networks, the privacy tends to be specific for hiding ve-
hicular identity, position, and prevent from tracking by malicious enti-
ties. In terms of vehicular privacy, there are six different requirements:
short-tern linkability, long-term unlinkability, anonymity, Pseudonymity,
accountability (non-repudiation) and location privacy [3]. These six prop-
erties in ITS are explained respectively.
• Short-term linkability: Short-term linkability is a desirable property
in ITS applications [32]. Assuming a vehicle sends two or more
messages within a small time frame, the receiving vehicle should
be able to verify that these messages came from the same source.
Enforcing short-term linkability can effectively prevent from Sybil
attacks by a malicious user or a compromised OBU impersonating
multiple vehicles [33]. In vehicular networks, vehicles frequently
broadcast messages with their speed, current location and acceler-
ation. These messages are used to build up a trajectory of nearby
OBUs. The location privacy of users is not affected by short-term
linkability because the small time frame increment does not impact
the location privacy of the vehicle [34].
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• Long-term unlinkability: A basic location privacy requirement for
vehicular networks is long-term unlinkability. A malicious user
must not be able to link messages sent by a vehicle to the attributes
of that vehicle such as location, type of car and applications. Track-
ing protection must be implemented to protect the users from link-
ability of two or more successive positions.
• Anonymity: Anonymity describes that a target vehicle cannot be
distinguished from a set of other vehicles. It is a term used to
mean the ability of the user to access a resource or service without
disclosing its user identity. This means that the subject may per-
form an action without disclosing its user identity to third-parties.
Anonymity techniques provide means to know the set of users that
cannot see the identity of someone performing certain actions. Hence,
when the action of a user is anonymous, another subject will not be
able to determine either the identity or even a reference to the iden-
tity of the user.
• Pseudonymity: Pseudonymity is a technique used to ensure that a
user may access a resource or service without disclosing its identity,
but can still be accountable for that use. Since the user is account-
able for the use, it can be regarded as conditional pseudonymity or
reversible pseudonymity. Conditional pseudonymity is required
where the identity information of violators need to be revealed by
law enforcement authorities for liability purposes. Similarities ex-
ist between pseudonymity and anonymity. While both protects the
identity of the user, pseudonymity uses a reference to the user’s
identity for accountability.
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• Accountability(Non-repudiation): Accountability, also consider as
non-repudiation, refers to the inability of a vehicle to deny its ma-
licious or illegal behaviour. Anonymity exists only when the ve-
hicle has a good reputation. While anonymity protects the loca-
tion privacy of users, a misbehaving or faulty vehicle that caused
an accident needs to be identified for possible prosecution. Note
that pseudonyms are linked to information that allows the certifi-
cate authority to establish a forensic evidence against a misbehav-
ing user for the purpose of accountability.
• Location Privacy: The exact location information of the user must
be protected from unauthorised entities. The user’s trajectory which
contains position data of the user’s present and past locations in-
cluding points of interest must not be revealed to unauthorised en-
tities.
In vehicular communication network, security of communication is
crucial for providing a secure channel of message transmission. There
are four elements for security requirements.
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality could be achieve by encrypting the
message. So the message would become ciphertext which is un-
readable by a human or a computer without the correct cipher to
decrypt it. A common method to justify the confidentiality is the
ciphertext length. Longer ciphertext means achieved higher secu-
rity level as it requires longer processing time for the receiver to
decrypt the data.
• Integrity: Integrity means that the message from sender to receiver
has not be been modified. Since the safety messages in VCS af-
fects driver’s decision, it is important to guarantee the consistency,
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trustworthiness and accuracy of the message. An extra data block
might be attach with the message, including Checksum or Message
Authentication Code (MAC), to provide integrity.
• Availability: The data needs to stay available consistently when-
ever the user requires to access it. To achieve availability, the secu-
rity manager should ensure a suitable message distribution scheme
that effectively use the capacity of the communication network. In
addition, the computing system should store and process the data,
and also provide robustness in case hardware failures or attacks
such as Denial of service (DoS) or Distributed Denial of service
(DDoS) attacks [35].
• Authenticity: To make the receiver trust the authenticity of mes-
sages from the sender, a receipt should be attach in the message.
Due to the fact that the nature of the wireless communication, ma-
licious users could launch the man-in-the-middle attack [36]. The
message could be tampered or deleted during the message trans-
mission. Therefore, the receiver needs to make sure that the mes-
sage is sent from a legit source. Authentication receipts, such as
digital certificates, are used to provide legitimacy of the message.
Digital certificates are supposed to include information about the
valid time of the sender. In addition, blockchain [37] is a novel
technology to achieve distributed authentication, which has been
taken into account by many researchers recently.
• Traceability and Revocation: A user that abuses the network should
be traceable by an authority. The revocation of the misbehaving
user by the authority should be timely. This reduces the impact of
the misbehaving user on the network.
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• Efficiency: The cryptographic protocols used in vehicular and mo-
bile networks should be computationally efficient. The key man-
agement scheme must incur limited computational overhead. To
ensure effective operation, lightweight key management scheme
should be used.
The authors in [31] introduce a classification of privacy based on the
data Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) target to preserve. Four
types of data are introduced, namely, published data, observable infor-
mation, re-purposed data and leaked data. Published data means that
the information was made available on purpose. This type of data could
be a database of anonymised position information of vehicles. Observ-
able information is the data that the malicious users try to obtain and use.
For instance, a malicious user could overhear unencrypted messages sent
by target vehicles and use the information to track vehicles. Re-purposed
data means privacy violations by the entity were given confidential infor-
mation by users but misuse it for unauthorised purposed. For example,
a location-based service provider sells user location data to third parties.
Leaked data is the information that was intended to be confidential but
was exposed by means of illegal measures or was accidentally made pub-
lic.
In vehicular network, identity privacy of drivers and location privacy
of vehicles are two crucial parts to be considered. Identity privacy needs
more attention as it directly relate to individuals. However, data life cy-
cle management and database security, etc., are out of the scope. In this
thesis, location privacy is the main concern, which is hiding a vehicular
past, current and future whereabouts. Moreover, as the location privacy
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seems to be the most directly affected privacy domain, the main prop-
erties investigated in this thesis are anonymity and unlinkability. Many
researches pointed out that insufficient or absent measures to protect ve-
hicular location privacy could cause a significant hindrance of drivers
participating in VANET [36], [38]. Apart from the uncovering of per-
sonal and private data, there are the possibility that law enforcement
would require vehicular network become mandatory for all vehicles on
the road [39]. Therefore, drivers might even do not have a chance to
choose whether they are willing to participate or not.
3.1.2 Location Privacy Challenges
More and more individuals seem to accept and tolerate the growing inter-
est from industry to collect personal information as they will obtain per-
sonalised service. Many online services which seem to be free of charge
require the user to uncover personal data to be used. In this case, users
are able to decide whether the benefits they obtained outweigh the value
of information they abandoned. Therefore, some individuals proposed
that privacy or private information could be seen as a kind of currency
[40], [41].
The location privacy is the ability to hinder third parties from obtain-
ing the current location and location changes of vehicles [13]. However,
some studies states that lots of test subjects could sell one month loca-
tion data at a low cost for third parties commercial use [41] [42]. Many
people do not strongly concern about tracking their location by a third
party, while they feel mobile operator, location-based service providers
or government already collect their positions all the time. Hence service
provider suggests the preservation of location privacy might not be seen
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as a crucial part of the development of ITS. They believe that preserva-
tion of location privacy would not bring a significant impact on financial
success of ITS. Furthermore, a business case about not preserving users’
privacy has been proposed as personal data which they believe can be
used for targeted advertisement or sold to others. For instance, many
European mobile operators plan to sell customer location information
[43].
So far, individuals usually have the right to choose if they want to
keep their private information and do not use a service. However, in
most vehicular network cases, the scenario is quite different. The major
benefits of ITS is traffic safety which most likely has higher priority than
their privacy. In the context of vehicular networks, drivers are forced to
give up their location information when there is no protection of privacy.
Even if some individuals choose their privacy over safety, future strat-
egy seems most likely to leave them no choice as ITS service could be
compulsory on the road.
A violation of location privacy could cause severer effects. Exposed
individuals not only could have obtrusive advertisements, but also have
the implicit danger of being tracked by malicious third parties. Thus,
unprotected vehicular location could cause serious results from embar-
rassment to financial loss or loss of social standing. Obviously, different
entities who attack drivers’ location privacy can cause different level of
malicious influence. Those attackers could be other users of the same ITS
system, such as service provider, application developer, system operator,
or governmental department. Moreover, the violation of one privacy part
could has influence on other parts. Especially, when location privacy is
compromised, adversaries could use this information plan and act ma-
licious behaviour. For example, knowing an individual drove to gym
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could indicate a certain period without further movements so that adver-
sary could plan attack that might put the driver in danger or plan a house
burglary. Another case could be that a cash-in-transit vehicle needs high
anonymity and high level of location privacy. In order to prevent from
these situation, a system must provide sufficient anonymity which is the
precondition of location privacy. Anonymity means that an individual
cannot be recognised and identified so that could preserve their location
privacy. In the next section, vulnerabilities and privacy violation will be
illustrated regards to vehicular communications.
3.2 Threat Model
3.2.1 Adversary Characteristics
Many location privacy preserving approaches in literature have simi-
lar adversary characteristics. The more knowledge that the adversaries
have, the lower level of location privacy can be achieved. In this thesis,
the adversaries was classified as follow:
Global vs. Local: Compared to a local adversary, the global adver-
sary has an overall coverage of the VANET. It can then eavesdrop every
message diffused by any vehicle, whereas the local adversary only could
have access to vehicle communication in a single point and within a lim-
ited range.
Active vs. Passive: An active adversary is more dangerous than a pas-
sive adversary since it can alter or inject messages, while a passive ad-
versary can only eavesdrop messages and hardly be detected
Internal vs. External: An internal adversary is an authenticated mem-
ber of VANETs system. An external adversary is considered as an in-
truder like an observer on the infrastructure.
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Static vs. Adaptive: Static adversaries choose an attacking technique
or strategy before launching an attack regardless of how the attack pro-
gresses. Adaptive adversaries observe the network by learning the sys-
tem configuration and parameters. In location privacy, most threat mod-
els use adaptive adversaries which are described in the context of loca-
tion privacy as inference attack.
There are other methods for attacking the vehicular network system.
For example, accessing traffic monitoring cameras or hijacking the Global
Positioning System (GPS) allows tracking the target vehicle.
3.2.2 Privacy Attacks on ITS
In this section, cyber attacks are illustrated in terms of security and pri-
vacy in intelligent transportation system.
Denial of Service (DoS): The Denial of Service attack is one of most
typical attacks in the communication network system. In traditional DoS
attack, adversaries launch the attack by sending a large amount of useless
data in a short time period to occupy the total network bandwidth or
memory storage [44].
Jamming: Attackers generate interference (e.g. strong white noise)
within a small area. This attack prevents nodes within the coverage area
from receiving useful messages. All the messages would be classified
into noise since the noise power is too strong. Vehicles suffer from this
attack can’t obtain safety information from vehicular network. The jam-
ming attack is a relatively easy way to launch, even without any knowl-
edge about cryptographic mechanism. Although this kind of attack is
hard to avoid, it only implements and effects in a small coverage area. A
large number of attackers are needed if attackers want to interface large
area of the network. Some cutting-edge physical layer technologies are
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investigated to improve Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) to eliminate nega-
tive effect caused by strong background noise.
Forgery Message and Impersonation: Message forgery in cryptography
means the behaviour to confuse message receivers. Impersonation attack
can be treated as a higher level of forgery attack. This attack occurs when
an attacker steals someone else’s identity by sending messages using the
stolen identity [45]. The forgery attack harms the non-repudiation abil-
ity and accountability of the security systems. A smart attacker might
deploy forgery attack along with other kinds of attacks. By threat the
effectiveness of the non-repudiation and accountability, message forgery
provides a barrier to prevent the network repairing by the network man-
ager. As an updated version of forgery attack, impersonation attack is
even more difficult to correct and recovery [46]. One straightforward
harm of this attack is about node priority. Priority issues are considered
in ITS safety notifications, ambulance, police cars, fire trucks and Spe-
cial Purpose Vehicles should send safety messages with higher priority
so that they can save time on the road. Moreover, the vehicle whose iden-
tity has been stolen will suffer from the personal credit crisis, it could be
revoked from the legal user list [46]. Adversaries may masquerade as
fake Road Side Unit (RSU) in some severe scenarios, which counts the
most dangerous attack. In this case, impersonation attack is accounted a
formidable way to mislead ITS environment. On the other hand, mali-
cious users may use fake identity and fabricate or alter false safety noti-
fications, which makes more difficult to track adversaries.
To prevent the above attacks, the non-repudiation schemes are con-
sidered as the possible methods, such as digital signatures and certifi-
cates. They help to reduce the probability of message using by illegal
and unauthorised users. Encryption and access control are also included
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as double insurance. However, the effectiveness of the above methods is
reduced if attackers already join in the network for a while [47].
Eavesdropping: The eavesdropping attack in VCS indicates the ma-
licious behaviour to obtain the data inside the messages. The attacker
could be a compromised vehicle OBU or a fake RSU station. These attack-
ers locate in the middle of the communication route, this eavesdropping
behaviour also known as ’Man-in-the-Middle’. The eavesdropped infor-
mation can be used for two purposes: The first one threaten the message
security, malicious users try to illegally access the encrypted data inside
messages. Another aims to collect privacy-related data, linking the sim-
ilar data, tracking back to a specific identity and further violating user
privacy. To employ privacy violation attack, adversaries need to collect
other users’ privacy-related information first. Varies of messages are sent
periodically within VCS, control and safety messages include basic ve-
hicle information (e.g. vehicle type, location, speed) by default. Thus
attackers violate privacy by retrieving these default information inside
periodic messages.
3.3 Privacy Preservation Techniques
Information privacy becomes a critical issue in VCS with the develop-
ment of applications in VCS, such as safety messages and vehicle navi-
gation services. In order to prevent the privacy information from abuse,
information senders usually hide the privacy-related information in the
messages, such as location, node identity and source network address.
Some approaches assure privacy level by restricting the information ac-
cessibility. Authors in [48] describe a framework to allow a message
sender to limit the accuracy of location data, as well as to control the
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delivery rate through the pre-agreed restriction policy. An alternative ap-
proach in [48] describes a method to control information access by check-
ing certificates. The third-party service must display the valid certificate
before getting the permission to retrieve the privacy-related information.
Apart from the above approaches, a commonly used approach to protect
privacy is that the vehicles broadcast messages using pseudonym and
frequently change their pseudonyms. The pseudonym changing means
that the vehicle needs to change all the identifier information from phys-
ical layer to application layer. A more detailed discussion about various
privacy prevention methods is displayed below.
Mix Zone: The mix zone [49] model assumes a trusted system, lo-
cated between the real OBU location data and the third-party message
receptions. It is designed as a geographic region within the ITS envi-
ronment. All the vehicles within the range are required to change their
pseudonyms at the same time, as well as not to broadcast safety mes-
sages or application messages with the previous pseudonym. These ve-
hicles are marked as ’mixed’ because any privacy-related information
can’t be observed from outside. Generally speaking, the mix zone must
be selected carefully to maximise the privacy level. For example, a traf-
fic junction will help a lot to mix the privacy-related messages by con-
taining a large number of vehicles from various directions. Addition-
ally, pseudonym changing is supposed to happen within the mix zone
to improve the level of privacy. Therefore the long-term movements of
vehicles are untraceable after vehicles depart the mix zone.
Authors in [50] analyse the effectiveness of pseudonym changing in-
side mix zone. Authors simulate the probability of a successful attack
with respect to the size of the attacker monitor coverage. The results
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show the mix zone meet the privacy requirements if an attacker moni-
tors less than half of the mix zones within the network.
Silent Period: The silent period is defined as a short period of time to
change pseudonyms [51]. Authors in [51] analyse that the mix zone is
useful to protect the privacy information from the application provider.
It is because the third-party applications threats privacy by eavesdrop-
ping the identity-based information from a message. However malicious
user normally eavesdroppers a period time of communication [51]. For
instance, powerful attackers are capable of tracking the position of the
vehicle by measuring the signal strength. The safety messages are sent
continuously and the message sent from the same vehicle have very sim-
ilar signal strength. To solve the problem, all the vehicles within the
silent period are forbidden to broadcast safety messages or reply the
application-related messages. Neither the previous pseudonym nor the
next pseudonym is allowed to broadcast within the silent period. The
conclusion in [51] proves that the silent period with both constant and
variable time length provides better privacy level.
A similar scheme called CARAVAN using silent mode with pseudonym
changing as well [52]. Authors try to avoid the tracking vulnerability
through safety message broadcasting. Attack models (simple and corre-
lation tracking) to match two possible locations of a vehicle are described
along with the solution scheme. CARAVAN combines an enhanced silent
period technique with group navigation. The group navigation creates a
mix zone to break the link between the
Pseudonym: Authors in [53] believe that continuously using the long
lifespan type of certificate is more likely to lead privacy issue. Unlike the
traditional Internet system uses long lifespan type of certificate, certifi-
cates in vehicular communication system could be used by attackers to
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track vehicular mobility patterns when vehicles periodically broadcast
their position messages attached with vehicles’ certificates. Even if the
broadcast messages do not attach the exact position information, the at-
tackers could still predict vehicles’ position by monitoring a wide area or
cooperating with other eavesdroppers.
There is a potential solution to manage certificate, Security Credential
Management System(SCMS)[54]. It is one of the leading virtual public
key infrastructure candidate designs in United States. SCMS proposes
that vehicles carry multiple pseudonym certificates and each certificate
only lasts a short period. The batch of pseudonym certificates is expected
to cover a long duration, for example, few years. In addition, it also en-
ables revocation and linkage in case of misbehaviour. There are few ad-
vantages and disadvantages about this SCMS. On one hand, the system
revokes the misbehaved vehicles and all related certificates, which is bet-
ter than revoke certificates that have been used in every bad events. On
the other hand, certificate revocation list (CRL) is huge as the system re-
vokes long term certificates of vehicles and short term certificates. So
bandwidth usage could become burden if many vehicles revoked.
3.4 Pseudonym Management System
The authors in [55] illustrate an abstract pseudonym lifecycle which could
suit most pseudonym approaches for vehicular networks. The overview
of the abstract pseudonym lifecycle can be seen in fig 3.1. Based on the
certain pseudonymous schemes, some of the actual lifecycle steps might
be different. However, this abstract pseudonym lifecycle contains es-
sential parts in almost all pseudonymous authentication schemes. There
are 5 phases in the abstract pseudonym lifecycle, namely: issuance, use,
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change, resolution, and revocation.
FIGURE 3.1: Abstract of Pseudonym Lifecycle [55]
Pseudonym issuance: A Certificate authority (CA) issues long-term ve-
hicle id (VID) which can be treated as a signed certificate. Similar to the
vehicle identification number (VIN) that is printed on the vehicle chassis
by the manufacturer, the VID also could be pre-installed in the OBU of
the vehicle according to IEEE 1609.2 [4]. The trusted authority could be
a vehicle registration authority that issues the vehicle registration and
license plate. For instance, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency
(DVLA) which is an executive agency, sponsored by the Department for
Transportation UK could be the trusted authority to issue the VID. Hence
the VID can also be seen as an electronic license plate (ELP) [55]. The VID
is used to ensure the authenticity of the vehicle and only valid vehicles
could obtain short-term pseudonyms and thus participate in v2v and v2x
communications. A common approach based on third party issuance,
whereby all pseudonyms are generated by the certificate authority (CA)
or TA. Another approach is pseudonym self-issuance. The authors in [55]
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believe that vehicles are able to perform pseudonym self-issuance and
generation autonomously once the vehicle’s OBU has been initialised.
Pseudonym use: Vehicles use short-term pseudonyms to participate in
the vehicular communications. Pseudonym use can be broken down into
two steps, namely, authentication of outgoing messages and verification
of incoming messages. On sender side, the authentication of the sender’s
message can be achieved by signing pseudonym certificate to messages.
This allows receivers to authenticate the sender which has a valid cre-
dentials, and to ensure the messages integrity during transmission. On
receiver side, vehicles which received the messages need to verify if the
pseudonym of the sender is legit and valid. Unlike traditional online
validity verification, all required information needs to be done by the
vehicles as high mobility and bandwidth restraints of vehicular commu-
nication networks [56].
Pseudonym change: As previous discussed about short-term pseudonyms,
pseudonyms only valid for a short lifespan. Therefore, frequently chang-
ing pseudonyms is recommended by IEEE SAE [57] and ETSI [24] in or-
der to prevent from linking attack and tracking. There are many different
approaches to change pseudonyms based on timing, location, nearby ve-
hicles or message contents. In the next section, more depth literature
review of pseudonym change scheme will be illustrated.
Pseudonym revocation: The pseudonym certificates of misbehaving or
faulty vehicles need to be revoked to ensure the network performance
and safety of other vehicles. Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is com-
monly used for certificate revocation. Typical approaches for pseudonym
revocation will be discussed in section 3.4.2.
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3.4.1 Pseudonym Change Schemes
The real challenge is the change rate of changing pseudonyms [58]. There
are numerous proposals about pseudonym change scheme in VANET.
Petit [55] published a survey in 2015 for comprehensive analysing pseudonym
schemes in various directions. Yet there is no common agreement on the
most effective scheme or the most useable strategy. Authors from [59],
[60] proposed a straight approach to change the pseudonyms in a fixed
or random time. Instead of storing a larger number of pseudonyms in the
OBU, each vehicle retains a pseudonym set, which called pseudonym
pool, to use at certain time slots. However, an obvious problem is the
timing of changing pseudonyms that could be inappropriate. For ex-
ample, if the adversary recognises the pseudonym change fixed period,
pseudonyms will be linked easily [61]. Moreover, as soon as a vehicle
replaced its pseudonym without enough vehicles surrounded, the pos-
sibility of being tracked might be much higher compared with other op-
timal changing scenarios. Thus, the context-based pseudonym chang-
ing scheme has been introduced to solve this problem. They suggested
that pseudonyms only switch when the vehicle believes the switch ac-
tion could cause confusion for a malicious user, e.g., the scenario could
be several vehicles have similar speed and direction [62], [63]. The au-
thors from [51] proposed that vehicles could have a silent period. At
this random time interval, vehicle does not transmit any messages even
basic safety beacon. Hence, eavesdropping attacker could not know the
exact time when vehicle changed its pseudonym. Consequently, they
believe this approach would confuse attackers. Hoh et al. [61] suggests
the uncertainty-aware path cloaking algorithm that guarantee a specified
greatest time-to-confusion and prevent from identification risks. Lefevre
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[64] indicates there is a trade-off between data and privacy. These fre-
quent pseudonym switch may hinder the safety applications which heav-
ily depend on VANET. Other researchers also proposed mix-zones, vehicle-
centric, density-based and synchronous change. Mix-zone is a geograph-
ical area (e.g., car park and office) where no location-aware applications
are available and where could help vehicle switch their pseudonyms [65],
[66]. They believe the mix-zones could make pseudonym changing more
effective. Vehicle-Centric is an approach that making pseudonym switch
rely on the status of vehicle itself. Swing and Swap were proposed by Li
[5], that vehicles independently decide the location and timing to change
their pseudonyms. Vehicles change pseudonym when they change speed
or direction, so that attacker could not find out the correlate node location
based on the prediction of node movements. In the strategy of density
based, to avoid ineffective pseudonym changing, the change scheme that
called Crowd is based on a function of the vehicle current surrounding
neighbour density [67], [68].
3.4.2 Pseudonym Resolution and Revocation
The Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is the most widely used certificate
revocation scheme. A typical modern CRL which called RFC 3280 also
known as X.509 was proposed back in 2002, and RFC 5280 obsoletes RFC
3280 as a newer version [69], [70]. CRL schemes assume that each node
follows a copy of CRL which is issued by the central manager (e.g. Cer-
tificate Authority). A certificate is considered as invalid if its digital iden-
tifier is included in the certificate revocation list. The certificate authority
is responsible to periodically distribute the revoked certificates in order
to timely update CRLs among the network. The X.509 CRL is widely
used in typical Internet applications, such as, user authentication and
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IPsec. The authors in [71], [72] discussed the way to distribute X.509
CRL for VANET. They proposed that RSUs and vehicles could distribute
CRL from certificate authority to nearby nodes. In [73], the authors ap-
plied CRL in smart grid to manage certificate, and also illustrate a format
of CRL to update messages. Three fields are important for the CRL re-
ceivers, namely the list of revoked certificates, the name of CRL issuer,
and the signature of CRL issuer. The list of revoked certificates contains
the certificate identifier, revoke reason and time-stamp. The list is used
for legit node to distinguish the invalidate certificates. The CRL issuer
name and signature are used to maintain the integrity and authenticity
of the CRL messages. When a node receives CRL list from CA, it firstly
checks the signature of the message. After the receiver verify the signa-
ture, it will add the updated list to the local CRL.
3.5 Distributed Ledger Technology
Nowadays, Bitcoin attracts a lot of attention along with its blockchain
concept, which was proposed in 2008 [37]. In simple terms, a blockchain
is a synchronised and distributed ledger which stores a list of blocks.
Each block records a set of validated transactions (e.g. user information
and a receipt) and securely links to the previous block. Central man-
agers are removed from the blockchain structure and the public ledger is
maintained by all the network participants instead. This is realised by a
protocol that achieves a trustworthy consensus about the chain of blocks
created. In other words, network nodes can agree (deterministically) on
the history and order of blocks that were created, and on which node is
allowed to add the next block to the chain.
The leader election of the node that can add the next block may be
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performed through a variety of techniques. For example, Proof of Work
poses a cryptographic puzzle to nodes based on a cryptographic hash
function, the last local block seen, and the pool of transactions to be pro-
cessed at a local node. A node that solves this puzzle announces the
solution on the network, and other nodes accept such solution only if all
transactions in the new block validate, the block does correctly point to
the last block, and no other such solution was received beforehand. Since
solving a puzzle is hard but verifying a solution is easy, this system pro-
vides security and effective validation and does not have a single point
of failure.
The network will reach eventual consistency since some regions may
temporarily diverge in their opinion of who won the next block. Since
nodes hold an entire block tree, such disputes get resolved eventually
as all nodes consider the path in the local tree with the “biggest overall
work” to be the genuine chain (and this choice may vary over time).
Blockchain offers a means of creating a trustworthy record of trans-
action histories in a network of nodes in which there exists mistrust.
This is a conservative trust model for VCS, where some parts of the net-
work would be within trusted computing bases (e.g. the CA) but other
parts would be more open or even publicly accessible (e.g. the vehicles
as nodes).
Blockchain security is achieved in a manner that reflects the design
choices of the blockchain. For example, when Proof of Work is used for
consensus, then one would need to control more than 50% of the nodes in
the network in order to rewrite the blockchain history and so corrupt data
veracity. This high degree of resiliency is what makes blockchain attrac-
tive in settings in which faults and malicious manipulation may corrupt
integrity of data ledgers. All transactions on the blockchain are traceable,
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back to the very first ‘genesis’ block. The transactions are tamper proof
— any attempt to tamper with them is immediately broadcast to the en-
tire network and detected. That also means that once transactions are
committed to the blockchain, there is no going back to edit or delete it.
Blockchains can change all that as they enable connected devices to be
smart independent agents, that can not only identify themselves to other
machines securely, but also carry out micro-transactions based on a set of
rules or smart contracts that cannot be tampered with.
3.5.1 DLT Applications
Blockchains are beginning to be used not only for decentralised cryp-
tocurrencies, but also for a wide range of applications including those in
Internet-of-Things (IoT) scenarios [74]–[79].
The authors in [74] proposed a new digital currency based on Bitcoin,
that provides better scalability and flexibility. The Authors in [75] use
blockchain to build a decentralised personal data management system.
The blockchain plays as a monitor for the access control of the personal
data. When a user intends to access the database or retrieve data from
database, an access transaction is generated. After get permission of the
access, users will describe their needs in data transaction to complete the
communication in the blockchain system. Papers [78], [79] aim to use
blockchain to provide a decentralised platform for trading local energy
generation between both energy prosumers and consumers.
Despite the fact that blockchain has received a lot of attention from
the banking industry, people find that the use of blockchain can also im-
prove other systems such as insurance, electric vehicles charging and car
sharing services [76].
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3.5.2 Consensus Mechanisms
Consensus mechanisms are protocols that all participated nodes all agree
on, which are used to synchronise the time with each other and make
sure transactions are legitimate. The consensus mechanism is an impor-
tant part for the blockchain system in order to function rightly. Basically,
the mechanism makes sure all nodes are using same blockchain, all trans-
actions are constantly checked and the blockchain is constantly audited
by all nodes. There are many ways to agree consensus, the following
mechanisms are most popular ones among them all.
Proof of Work
Proof of Work (POW) is one of the most commonly used consensus mech-
anism and was the first used by Bitcoin. For most cryptocurrency, min-
ing is the process of both adding a new transaction to the blockchain
(through securing and verifying) whilst releasing new currency/coins.
The consensus mechanism used in a blockchain establishes, in a dis-
tributed way, an agreement between all network nodes, instead of re-
lying on a central party’s decision. The most widely known and used
consensus mechanism for blockchains is Proof of Work (PoW), which is
a mining race in which nodes try to solve a hard cryptographic puzzle
concurrently. The PoW system was originally proposed as a means of
deterring spam email [80]. All PoW-based applications (e.g, Bitcoin and
the current Ethereum) require participating nodes to contribute a signif-
icant amount of computation power in order to obtain a digital proof of
work that can be verified easily. The process by which nodes compete
in finding such proof of work is called mining. The first node to solve
the cryptographic puzzle for the next block to be added to the chain will
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be elected/accepted as leader and is then able to add the new block for
which it found proof of work to the chain. These new, individual blocks
are added by miners and contain a proof of work. Many cryptocurren-
cies have used adopted version of this consensus mechanism. The POW
process is also known as mining and all nodes that participate the pro-
cess called miners. The mining process is a complex mathematical puz-
zles. The first node who solved the problem enjoys the right to update
the network with new block and earn incentives. In summary, mining
keeps all nodes in the Bitcoin network in sync. It enforces that the trans-
actions are committed in the same order by all nodes, thus preventing
someone from double spending. In the following, the process has been
briefly illustrated in details. The blockchain consists of blocks that con-
tain transactions. Each miner needs to hash the latest block header by
using Double SHA 256 [81]. In order to make the mathematical puzzle
artificially hard to solve for miners, the hash result of the solved block
has to meet certain conditions. Firstly, the hash functions are asymmet-
ric, which means it would take a lot of time to find the answer but it is
very easy to verify if the answer is right. Secondly, the hash of a block
represent a numerical value. To solve the puzzle, miners need to keep
trying to get the hash result below a certain numerical value. The nu-
merical value is know as target hash. As the nature of the hash functions,
there is only one hash for each block, as known as a digital fingerprint. In
order to get the hash of block to falls under the target hash, miners add
a random number within their block, which called nonce. As a result,
miners keep trying new nonce, that include it in the block, until the hash
result falls below the target hash or new block has been solved by other
miner. In this puzzle solving process, every miner enjoys the same proba-
bility if they have same computation power, more specifically, same hash
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rate. No mater how long this miner stays in the blockchain network, the
miner has no advantage in each round compared with miners who just
participated the network. It also means that if one miner wants to solve
the puzzle faster than others, they need more computation power. Fur-
thermore, the difficulty target of these mathematical puzzle changes pe-
riodically based on the blocks solving time. For example, target hash rate
will change every 2016 blocks in Bitcoin network. The Bitcoin network
sets the average mining time of each round at 10 minutes. If blocks are
generated too fast, the puzzles get more difficult to solve, and if they are
generated longer than 10 minutes, the puzzles difficulty would change
to lower level. To solve the hash function, many types of hardware could
be used for mining blocks, namely, central processing unit (CPU) min-
ing, graphics processing unit (GPU), and Application-specific integrated
circuit (ASIC) mining etc. CPU mining uses personal computer’s CPU to
validate transactions in a PoW consensus mechanism. GPU mining make
use of GPU card to mining blocks, which are more powerful and have
less power consumption. Because GPU’s are more purpose driven to do
singular task. Lastly but not the least, the ASIC mining a customised cir-
cuit for mining. It could easily outperform CPUs and GPUs in terms of
speed and efficiency.
There are many research believer proof of work has a major draw-
back, which is the massive resource consumption. With the total com-
putation power improvement, miners need to consume much more re-
source especially electricity to mine blocks, which leads a very unsus-
tainable work in the future. As a result, some blockchains are changing
to other consensus mechanism.
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Delegated Proof of Stake
Delegated Proof Of Stake (DPOS) is designed as a digital democracy, us-
ing voting and election process to prevent blockchain from centralisation
and malicious use. In a Delegated Proof Of Stake system users can stake
their coins to vote for a certain amount of delegates. The weight of their
vote depends on their stake, for example, if A stakes ten coins for a del-
egate and B stakes one coin for a delegate, A’s vote weighs ten times
heavier than B’s vote. Since delegates want to obtain as much votes as
possible, they are constantly incentives to create things valuable to the
community, as they are likely to receive extra votes for doing so.
Proof of Stake
Proof of Stake (PoS) makes use of the premise that a person can maintain
the blockchain network and validate transactions according to how many
coins he or she holds. For those who own most coins in the network, they
are not only more capable of mining, but also more responsible for keep-
ing the value of its coins high. In the PoS system, users can stake their
tokens to became a validator who have the chance to generate blocks.
Their tokens will be locked up for a certain time. Then a randomised
process is used to select who gets to produce the next block among all
the validators.
Proof of Capacity
Proof Of Capacity (PoC) is a consensus mechanism that makes use of
plotting. Unlike Proof Of Work miners are using computation power to
solve the mathematical puzzle, solutions are pre-stored in digital storage
(e.g. hard disks) in proof of capacity system. Once a storage has been
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plotted which means it has been filled with solutions, it can take part in
the block creation process.
Similar to proof of work, Whoever has the fastest solution to the puz-
zle of a (new) block can to produce the next block. The more storage
capacity means the more solutions that can be stored, finally can lead to
the higher possibilities of creating a block.
3.6 Measuring Privacy Using Simulation
3.6.1 Simulation Tool
Simulators are essential for researcher to prove their proposed scheme
and new idea. New algorithms and schemes can be implemented in
the simulation tools before researchers actually build real test bed. In
ITS field, there are network simulators and traffic simulators. Suitable
simulation tools could help researchers to create a virtual environment
and test the evaluation that caused by different parameters. In vehicular
communications, Network Simulator 2 (NS-2), Network Simulator 3 (NS-
3) and OMNeT++ are commonly used [82]–[84]. All three of them are
based on C++ language and open source software. Unlike NS2 and NS3
using command-line interface (CLI), OMNeT++ embedded and Eclipse-
based integrated development environment (IDE). The traffic simulators
are used for traffic simulation, mostly node mobility. SUMO, TranSim
and VanetMobiSim are commonly used in traffic simulator field [85]–
[87]. SUMO could be integrated with OMNeT++ and NS-3 to import
road map of real cities with road information and building size. In addi-
tion, Vehicles in Network Simulation (Veins) project and Prext project are
well extended library for OMNeT++ [88], [89]
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3.6.2 Privacy Metrics
There is many different privacy metrics used in discrete event simula-
tion. There is no single metric which meets all requirements of different
research groups. The privacy metrics could be different in terms of pri-
vacy property they use, complexity and designated target audience. In
terms of vehicular networks, anonymity set size and entropy are mainly
considered.
Anonymity Set Size (ASS)
We denote the anonymity set size as AS, which states among how many
other nodes the target cannot be distinguished. One of advantage of this
metric is the simplicity. So it is easy to calculate. We set an example in
figure.3.2. As can be seen from example, at time t the adversary aims
vehicle A as the target. At this time, the AS is equal to 1, which means
the driver’s location is fully explored. When the time moves to t + 1, as-
suming vehicle A changes its pseudonym to A1 and another vehicle A2
merges in the traffic. Despite the fact that two vehicles heading towards
different direction, it cannot be fully ruled out, leading to an anonymity
set size of 2. Because the AS has both A1 and A2. The k -anonymity
metric is similar to the AS [90]. A specific database record cannot be dis-
tinguished from at least k-1 individuals whose information also appears
in the database.
The anonymity set size has a big concern from other research, which
is the assumption that as the probability of being the target vehicle among
all vehicles around is equal [3]. In addition, whether the adversary has
knowledge about target, there is no method to present in this method. In
most scenarios, simulations should consider about adversary type and
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FIGURE 3.2: An Example for the Illustration of Privacy
Metrics
capability. The paper [91] exams 48 publications that are using discrete
event simulation for privacy evaluation. Despite the criticism of anonymity
set size, one third of the publications in their survey use the AS as a met-
ric to measure privacy. And the usage of this metric has no visible de-
crease over the years.
Entropy
Considered the fact that not all vehicles in the set have the same proba-
bility of being the target, entropy is from information theory has become
a popular metric to evaluate privacy. The entropy expresses the uncer-
tainty in a random variable. So the entropy of an anonymity set repre-
sents the beliefs of the attacker about the likelihood of individual vehi-
cles. It could measure the information obtained by the attacker. When all
vehicles in the set has equal chance to the target, the entropy reaches its
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maximum. The entropy H(X) is expressed as:
H(X) = −
AS
∑
i=1
pi log2 pi (3.1)
where AS is the size of the anonymity set and Pi denotes the proba-
bility of vehicle i being the target. Note that the entropy can also eval-
uate other types of uncertainty based on the the different definition of
pi. Figure 3.2 has been shown as the example again, assuming that the
attacker has no knowledge about which of the two vehicles between
A1 and A2 is the new pseudonym of A. Both pseudonyms are equip
probable (p = 50%). The entropy in this case is −1/2 ∗ log2(0.5) −
1/2 ∗ log2(0.5) = 1, which reaches maximum. Then a more clever at-
tacker who believes that the vehicle A turn around probability is 1 %.
So the probability of being A1 is 99 %. In this case, the entropy yield
−0.01 ∗ log2(0.01) − 0.99 ∗ log2(0.99) ≈ 0.08. As a result, this entropy
could represent the more accurate privacy for this certain scenario.
Degree of Anonymity
The authors in [92] proposed a possible solution to quantify the degree of
anonymity. The method normalises the entropy using maximum entropy
of the system HM:
HM = log2(|AS|) (3.2)
where |AS| is the absolute value of the anonymity set size.
The information that the adversary has gained by the attack can be
expressed as Hm − H(X). So the normalised entropy, also refer to degree
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of anonymity(d), is:
d = 1− HM − H(X)
HM
=
H(X)
HM
(3.3)
In figure 3.2, the attacker assigns a probability of 1% of A being A2
and therefore a probability of 99 % of A being A1. The entropy H(X)
would yield 0.08. And the HM = log2(|AS|) = 1 in this case. As a result
the degree of anonymity d = H(X)HM = 0.08. With the normalised result, d
states that the system is not providing a high degree of anonymity.
The authors in [91] also believe that entropy and degree of anonymity
are popular among related literature. Over 25 % of 48 publications were
classified as using entropy to evaluate anonymity.
Other Metrics
There are other metrics to evaluate privacy, namely, adversary’s success
rate, maximum tracking time, the total number of pseudonym changes,
and so on. The adversary’s success rate and the maximum tracking time
focus on the adversary side, and the definitions on both varies based
on to what extent an adversary could achieve the goal. For example,
if we define the goal is to track vehicle A with 100 % certainty, the ad-
versary success rate would be 0 as they cannot get rid of A2 as a pos-
sible pseudonym of A. However, if the goal is to track A with high cer-
tainty then attack could be counted as successful. Both methods may be
scenario-centric. Moreover, counting pseudonym change frequency can
only be seen as an indirect way. Because it does not measure to what ex-
tent the driver privacy. The advantage of this method is to evaluate how
the specific pseudonym change scheme works.
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3.7 Summary
This chapter presents the privacy preservation technology for intelligent
transportation systems. General privacy issue and location privacy chal-
lenges have been reviewed. In addition, the basic privacy and security
requirements are illustrated. The proposed solutions of privacy preserv-
ing mainly focus on the use of pseudonym, and were categorised based
on the lifecycle of pseudonym, namely Pseudonym issuance, use, change
and revocation. Furthermore, the digital distributed ledger technology
and related blockchain consensus mechanism were discussed. Lastly,
few privacy metrics, related characteristics and attributes have been dis-
cussed extensively.
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Chapter 4
Cooperative Pseudonym
Change Scheme for Vehicular
Communication System
This chapter presents the design and evaluation of a cooperative pseudonym
change scheme. In Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs), broadcasted
beacon messages are critical as most safety applications rely on them.
When it comes to privacy, the periodic and unencrypted ad-hoc commu-
nication causes privacy concerns. The authors in [13] believe adversaries
who have compatible hardware only need to receive a few beacon mes-
sages so that they can disclose the path a vehicle took if beacons are re-
lated to the same vehicle. One of the most accepted approaches for loca-
tion privacy preserving is the use of pseudonymity, that means a tempo-
rary alternative identifier is used for vehicles instead of its real identity.
Therefore, messages that contain vehicle ID, location, and speed will not
be easily linked to one physical vehicle. There are two ultimate goals of
using pseudonyms, that are achieving anonymity and unlinkability [6].
In this chapter, the cooperative context-aware pseudonym change scheme
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is presented to improve the level of anonymity and suit multiple scenar-
ios e.g. highway straight lanes and city based crossroads cases. Tradi-
tional pseudonym change schemes focus on the vehicle level (e.g. Swing
& Swap [5], mix zone [65], and silent period [51]. However, those tradi-
tional schemes either need specific requirement (e.g. particular location)
or timely change pseudonyms could still be tracked by adversaries. The
proposed scheme combines periodically pseudonym change from vehi-
cles’ OBU and mix zone scheme together. It does not only introduce road-
side infrastructure to assist similar context vehicle change pseudonyms
at the mix zone, but also allows vehicles change pseudonyms from their
pre-load pseudonym pools timely.
4.1 Cooperative Pseudonym Management
4.2 System Model
There are three main components in a typical VANET environment which
are Central Authority (CA), roadside units (RSU) and vehicles equipped
with a computerised device known as on-board unit (OBU). A descrip-
tion of each of component is covered below.
• CA: The CA is a third trusted party that is responsible of providing
public and private key pairs to vehicles and RSUs. Moreover, CA
is supposed to know the existence of all RSUs and has a reliable
connections to them.
• RSU: It is a stationary device placed along the roads and at inter-
sections, which is used to gather information about the road traffic
and broadcasts it to the OBUs in communication range. Also, an
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RSU can communicate with other RSUs and the CA to exchange
messages related to the road traffic through a secure channel.
• OBU: The OBU is a device that is equipped in a vehicle and it is
used to send and receive data to other OBUs or RSUs. Furthermore,
a tamper-proof device (TPD) is implanted with the OBU, and it is
responsible for storing public and private keys and other creden-
tials. Also, it performs the cryptographic operation while commu-
nicating with other OBUs and RSUs.
An example of basic structure of vehicular communication system
shows in figure 4.1. In the initial stage, each vehicle comes to Central
Authority (CA), and completes the registration with its Vehicle Identity
(VID) which is an authenticate ID like the vehicle identification number.
Then vehicle acquires corresponding public and private key pair, certifi-
cate, and initial pseudonym set that all generated by Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) which is built in a trusted authority. RSUs also need to
register with CA, in order to get their public and private key pair and
certificate. In addition, RSUs will have public keys of pseudonym certifi-
cates from each registered vehicle to authenticate vehicle in the future.
Meanwhile, RSUs will report traffic flow rate λ of vehicles in their trans-
mission range periodically.
4.2.1 Pseudonym Certificate Generation
In terms of pseudonym certificates, a system needs to have a large amount
of certificates for vehicles in order to fulfil privacy needs. Traditional way
is that vehicles request pseudonym certificate with CA using unique pub-
lic and private key each time. Unlike traditional pseudonym certificate
generation, butterfly keys are a novel cryptographic construction which
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FIGURE 4.1: system overview
allow a vehicle to obtain an arbitrary number of certificates and each with
related key pairs, using one request [7]. The approach enables vehicles
to get a large amount of short lifespan pseudonym in a set with a single
and small-sized request. In addition, the paper named Security Creden-
tial Management System (SCMS) [7] became one of the leading candi-
date designs for V2X security in US. For above reasons, we decide to use
butterfly key expansion for pseudonym generation. The procedure of
pseudonym certificate generation is shown in fig. 4.2.
s and e are two private keys which randomly picked by a vehicle ini-
tially. The corresponding public keys are S = s×G and E = e×G, where
G is the generator of an elliptic curve group. The vehicle also chooses
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FIGURE 4.2: The procedure of pseudonym certificate
generation [7]
two random seeds for pseudo-random functions f1and f2. Then the vehi-
cle sends the quadruple (S, f1, E, f2) to the Registration Authority (RA).
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When it comes to RA, RA generates β number of cocoon signature keys
by using caterpillar key S: Sˆi = S+ f1(i)×G, where 0 ≤ i ≤ β. Similarly,
the RA generates β number of cocoon signature keys Eˆi = S + f2(i)× G.
Then pairs of cocoon signature keys (Sˆi, Eˆi) from different vehicles are
then sent individually to the Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA) to
generate the corresponding pseudonym certificates. The pseudonym cer-
tificate authority which is a CA picks a random number ri and computes
the vehicle’s public signature key as Ui = Sˆi + ri×G. Then the PCA signs
the Ui with its digital signature and any required metadata meta (e.g. the
validity time of the key). As a result, the pseudonym certificate cereti is
given by the triple (Ui, meta, sigi). The PCA then uses Eˆi to encrypt the
resulting certificate and its companion data. This encrypted package is
also signed with the PCA own private key u. The PCA is sent this to the
RA, and RA relays back the corresponding certificates to the requesting
vehicle.
Lastly, the vehicle verifies the PCA’s digital signature on the encrypted
certificates, then uses private cocoon encryption key eˆi = e + f2(i) to de-
crypt the encryption. In addition, the vehicle verifies the validity of the
pseudonym certificate.
4.2.2 Distribution from CA
After initial pseudonym certificates generation during vehicle registra-
tion, CA generates N pseudonym certificates offline, and then distributes
a certain amount of pseudonym sets to each RSU. The number of sets
is determined by the density of traffic in corresponding areas which re-
ported by RSUs. For instance, an RSU with a higher flow rate would have
more pseudonym sets than others with lower traffic flow rate. When it
comes to the traffic flow rate λ , the RSU will monitor λ through the
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FIGURE 4.3: Pseudonym Change Scheme Basic Case
number of pseudonym request received from vehicle for a certain pe-
riod. Once there is a significant increase or decrease of the traffic flow
rate, RSU will update its POOLSIZE and then report back to CA for fu-
ture pseudonym distribution.
4.2.3 Distribution from RSU
A basic layout is shown in figure 4.3. There are three RSUs in the figure.
The previous RSU that vehicle v was in the transmission range with is
designated as RSUi−1, the RSU which v now stays within the range of
RSUi, and the following RSU that v is about to connect with is RSUi+1.
The pseudonym set ID (SID) is designated for Si to indicate the set send
from RSUi.
When vehicle v nearly runs out of its pseudonym sets and just enters
RSUi+1 range, it creates a pseudonym request which include a digest
of VID. The digest of VID is signed by the vehicle’s private key Skv
and encrypted by the CA’s public key PkCA to prevent the integration
Chapter 4. Cooperative Pseudonym Change Scheme for Vehicular
Communication System
61
of digest. The signature could prevent adversaries from impersonating
any other node, while the second encryption is to hide the information
from the RSU. In terms of the digest of VID, it is used for the purpose of
non-repudiation and accountability. The RSU stores a log of pseudonym
allocation including the pseudonym set id SID and the digest of destina-
tion vehicle id VID, in addition to a timestamp of when the pseudonym
delivery happened. In case of a misbehaviour or dispute, the CA could
retrieve information from RSUs asking for the log of pseudonym alloca-
tion a given time period. The CA will decrypt and retrieve the VID, and
match it with the pseudonym to analyse the concerned vehicle. In this
case, vehicles, especially malicious vehicles, could not deny their com-
mitment to an action. Then the pseudonym request is signed by vehicle’s
private key and encrypted by the public key of RSUi+1. Once RSUi+1
received the request, it verifies the message by decrypting it with its pri-
vate key. If the request message passed verification, RSUi+1 sends Si+1 to
vehicle v and records this action which is Si+1 delivers to v into its own
log.
4.3 Cooperative Pseudonym Change Scheme
The existing pseudonym change schemes either heavily rely on nodes
or RSUs, resulting in achieving highly probabilistic performance only
with strong security mechanism on nodes. Once malicious users came
from internal system or successfully compromised key nodes, the sys-
tems could not reach ideal anonymity. Schemes with nodes coopera-
tion (e.g. SlotSwap [62]) would occupy too WAVE bandwidth and be
hard to guarantee a synchronous change, while methods like [6] only us-
ing RSUs to coordinate pseudonym change would give too much power
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to RSU to control vehicles’ pseudonym. Our cooperative density-based
pseudonym change scheme aims to avoid shortcomings of previous schemes.
While the scheme in [6] let each RSU manage to each vehicle’s pseudonym
change within the range, the proposed scheme aims to mitigate the con-
trol of RSU by making RSU give the timestamp to change vehicles only
when vehicles are about to run out of pseudonym and request a new
set. In this case, vehicles normally change their pseudonyms with fixed
time slot. Every node keeps using a pseudonym in time slot length t,
then the vehicle switches pseudonym from its pseudonym set after time
reaches to the slot and marks the previous pseudonym used. Frequently
changing schemes could improve the anonymity of vehicles. In this case,
the vehicles privacy can be protected, especially where the area has less
RSU deployment (e.g. At the initial development stage of VCS). Al-
though independently changing pseudonym in fixed time could increase
anonymity, an attacker might be able to link the new pseudonym to then
ole one. Gathering surrounding vehicles with similar speed and head-
ing to change pseudonyms from their own set simultaneously could not
only improve the anonymity but also achieve the unlinkability. For above
reasons, this scheme adds RSUs to assist pseudonym change in the mix
zone.
The pseudonym changes are supposed to execute within mixed zones,
which are geographic regions within the VCS environment as shown
in figure4.4.. Generally speaking, the mixed zone must be selected care-
fully in order to maximise the level of privacy. For example, traffic junc-
tions, roundabouts and temporary car parks will help a lot with mix-
ing privacy-related messages as they contain a large number of vehicles
with similar status. As the pseudonym scheme requires RSU to assist
pseudonym changing, each mix zone must have one RSU placed. Thus,
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FIGURE 4.4: Mixed Zone Example
two and more vehicles with similar speed, location, and heading, that
are passing the same mix zone, could perform pseudonym change at the
same time, resulting in confusing the attacker and limiting the chance of
linkability of pseudonyms.
For this purpose, the following process will describe the actions of
RSU in the pseudonym change scheme:
• the RSU will use equation 4.1 to get the time range T that could
assure multiple vehicles in the same neighbourhood.
• the RSU will give similar context vehicles same timestamp each
time.
The requirements for vehicles can be divided into two categories.
Firstly, the RSU only provides pseudonym changing stamp to vehicles
that request to obtain new pseudonym set. Secondly, when vehicles con-
nected to the RSU, RSU gets vehicles status, e.g. position, direction and
speed from their connection messages. Then RSU will classify connected
vehicles into several groups based on their speeds and headings. The
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RSU will arrange to provide the same timestamp to connected vehicles
with similar context and will stay in the transmission range with a spe-
cific time range. For instance, an RSU in the middle of long straight
dual carriage way is most likely to divide vehicles into two parts as
they are heading to opposite directions. And based on their speed, RSU
will try to arrange as many as possible same direction vehicles that will
stay within its transmission range in a certain period to one group that
shares the same timestamp. The RSU will sending the same timestamp
to all cars from that group passing through in that specific time range T.
The time range T equals that the final time t f subtracts the initial time
ti, T = t f − ti. Denote that the average velocity vavg of vehicles on the
dual carriage way falling within the range of RSU, the vehicle obtaining a
timestamp ts at ti will have travelled an average distance of vavg ∗ (ts− ti),
while another vehicle received ts at t f from the same RSU will have trav-
elled vavg ∗ (ts − t f ). The difference of travelling distance is vavg ∗ T. In
order to assure qualified vehicles to stay in the same neighbourhood, the
difference of distance is not supposed to surpass the transmission range
of RSU r. Consequently, the time range should be:
T <= r/vavg (4.1)
4.4 Performance Evaluation
4.4.1 Scenario Design
The scenario design for Cooperative Pseudonym Change Scheme is mod-
eled as a 10 x 10 Manhattan network with d = 4, where d is the amount
of road segments at every intersection. This scenario considers all jobs of
CA have been finished in the initial stage. The simulation software used
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are OMNET++ and sumo [84], [85]. The mobility mode allows vehicles
keep a safe distance. Under the assumption of total M vehicles in the net-
work, the average umber of vehicles each intersection is ρ = M10∗10 . There
are 3 parameters for each intersection: (i) vehicle trajectories Pn,e, (ii) ve-
hicle entry time τ, (iii) vehicle delays parameters (µ and σ). The mobility
of vehicles between neighbouring intersections is based on Pn,e. Pn,n that
stands for the chance of a u-turn is set to be 0. Every Pn,e is defined ran-
domly for each intersection. The arrival time of vehicles are uniformly
distributed from 0 to τ seconds. When τ is close to 0, vehicles approach
the mix zone almost at the same time, which means the traffic is highly
congested. When τ is large, it means the traffic is at low congestion and
vehicle entry time can be distinguishable easily. Each delay parameters
(µ and σ) varies randomly for different intersections. We assume strong
tracking adversary have the knowledge about the system parameters.
4.4.2 Anonymity Analysis
In this section, two privacy metrics are presented to evaluate the anonymity
performance of proposed system. The anonymity set and entropy, which
were mentioned above from Chapter 3, purely focus on measure the level
of anonymity. The car arrival rate at any place on the road is assumed a
Poisson process with rate λ. Also, X is the random variable depicting the
number of vehicles that arrive at a certain point during the period of time
T. Thus, the probability X = x is
P(X = x) =
(λT)x
x!
e−λT (4.2)
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As a result, the expected number of vehicles during the period T can be
described as:
E(X = x) =
∞
∑
x=1
x
(λT)x
x!
e−λT (4.3)
As the expected number of vehicles specifically means surrounding
vehicles around the target vehicle and changing their pseudonyms si-
multaneously, these cars form the anonymity set (AS).
Since not all cars in the anonymity set are equally likely to be the tar-
get, entropy-based metric should be considered. It is used for measuring
the randomness of the probabilities that represent the possibility of each
vehicle being the target. N is assumed as the size of AS, and pi is the
probability of each vehicle be the target of the attacker. Entropy is de-
fined as:
H(X) = −
N
∑
i=1
pi log2 pi (4.4)
While the event k of a car approaching the mix zone at time τ is de-
noted by k = (n, τ), the event l of a car leaving the mix zone at time τ′
on the road e is denoted by l = (e, τ′). The probability of the car leaving
at the road e that entered at the road n is denoted by Pn,e. In addition,
the probability of the time from entering at road n and leaving at road e
is t is denoted by qn,e(t). As a result, the probability of the mapping of an
event that a vehicle entering event k and leave event l can be denoted by
Pk→l = Pn,eqn,e. For the number of n vehicles, the derivation is based on
[93]. The entropy of Pk→l is defined as:
H(l) = −
N
∑
k=1
pk→l log2(pk→l) (4.5)
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As the equation shows, the entropy would be affected by two factors:
1. the number of n cars in the mix zone. 2. the similarity of the distri-
bution of pk→l to the uniform distribution. In addition, the accurateness
of the probability of Pn,e and qn,e(t) is depend on the knowledge of the
attackers, which is closely related to the threat model.
The simple tracking means that the adversary is aware of the set of
car approaching or leaving the mix zone but no information about their
timing and trajectories. For example, A passive external attacker with
a restricted observation of an intersection. Since the attacker can only
know that it took a constant time C for vehicles in that mix zone. There-
fore, Pk→l for the attacker is a uniform distribution. The upper-bound
on the achievable location privacy, as known as maximum entropy, is
defined as:
H(l) ≤ log2(N) (4.6)
The maximum entropy stands for the maximum location privacy can
be achieved in this case, which only depends on the amount of vehicles in
the mix zone spot. As a result, the simple tracking gives an upper-bound
to the achievable unlinkability.
The correlation tracking means that the adversary observe the se-
quence and location of events by collecting vehicles’ entry/exit time and
position. Therefore, location privacy in the mix zone depends on the tra-
jectory of vehicles and the delay characteristics of the mix zone. For a
time duration τ, the number of N vehicles approach at the mix zone. So
vehicles arrival times τi are distributed based on a uniform distribution
where i = 1, 2...N, τi ∼ U (τ).
Here it is an example. Denote that d is the amount of road segments of
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TABLE 4.1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Name Value
Length of RSU coverage 600 m
BSM transmit power 20 mW
Vehicle number 300
Standard derivation of the traffic distribution function 6.88
Mean of the traffic distribution function 46.56
an intersection. d = 4, which means there are 4 exits in this intersection.
When vehicles entry from n1, the delay characteristics is
qn1,ei(t) ∼ N (µ1,i, σ1,i) (4.7)
where i = 1, 2, ..., d and e1, e2, e3, e4 state the directions that vehicles can
exit, namely, u-turn, left, straight, and right. Changing the delay charac-
teristics µandσ, the attackers model various types of intersections. Under
the assumption that the attacker has knowledge about the intersections
structure, the delay parameters µ and σ can be computed. Furthermore,
the adversary models the vehicles trajectories by selecting Pn,e < 1 based
on the prior knowledge about the road structure and intersection types.
Therefore, for every entry point n, the sum of Pn,e is ∑de=1 Pn,e = 1
4.4.3 Simulation Results
Based on the previous system design, the simulation parameters are shown
in table 4.1. This simulation is set to have each single RSU to cover the
area with 600 meters diameter using maximum transmit power Pmax =
20mW which is specified in SAE J2945 [20]. The traffic simulator is Veins
[94] which has been introduced in Chapter 3. The overall number of ve-
hicles is 300. The delay parameters µ = 46.56 and σ = 6.88 according the
measurement in [95].
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FIGURE 4.5: Anonymity set size with three average
speed
The influence of the vehicle’s average velocity on the anonymity set
size of the target vehicle is studied. From figure 4.5, the size of the
anonymity set rises at lower vehicle velocity. The reason is that vehicles
with low speed are likely to accumulate its surrounding neighbours. For
instance, taking the extreme case of a traffic jam causes very low vehicle
speeds. Thus, it is guaranteed that large amount of vehicles will turn up
around the target vehicle’s transmission range. When the speed of all
vehicles is 0, such as all vehicles are not moving at all, the anonymity set
size would reach the maximum as all vehicles in this coverage could be
considered as the target. In addition, the cooperative pseudonym change
scheme is compared with mix zone [65] and silent period [51] using av-
erage anonymity set size against vehicle average speed in figure 4.6 in
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FIGURE 4.6: Anonymity set size Comparison
simulation. Since proposed scheme includes both straight road and inter-
section scenarios, the average anonymity set size of the proposed scheme
performed better than other two. However, from above discuss men-
tioned in section 4.4.2, the anonymity set is based on the requirement that
each vehicle is equally likely to be the target vehicle. Therefore, it is not
enough for indicating the level of anonymity for the proposed system
as there might be prior knowledge of attacker for targeting the specific
vehicle.
As it can been seen from figure 4.7, the average location privacy ob-
tained in an intersection for various vehicle densities is presented. We
show that the achieved location privacy varies with respect to the differ-
ent level of traffic congestion and the vehicle density. The level of traffic
was defined by time range T from equation 4.1 which means vehicles in
low traffic passing the junction faster leads to a smaller interval of time
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FIGURE 4.7: Entropy with various vehicle densities
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FIGURE 4.8: Degree of Anonymity with Various Vehicle
Densities
T, and vice versa. So the simulation selects two different traffic condi-
tion based on the results in Figure 4.4, one is low traffic when time range
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FIGURE 4.9: Adversary Success Probability
T is 20 seconds, and heavy traffic is that T equals 60 seconds. The figure
shows the less congested the traffic is, and the easier it is for the adversary
to track vehicles based on their delay characteristics. The upperbound is
the average of Equation 4.6 over the amount of user every intersection in
the simulation. In order to expand the insight of different privacy met-
rics on the same model, we also tried degree of anonymity and tracking
success ratio. Figure 4.8 gives a normalised entropy using the maximum
entropy of the system. As it can be seen, both 20 seconds and 60 seconds
traffic congestion follow the same trend. With the bigger density of the
vehicle, it is getting more degree of anonymity which provide better loca-
tion privacy. Figure 4.9 presents the success probability of an adversary
in tracking vehicles. The adversary success probability is the ratio of the
number of successfully mapped vehicles to the total number of vehicles
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in a mix zone, averaged over all mix zones. As expected, the success ra-
tio decreases as the vehicle density increases. In addition, the low traffic
congestion condition is easier for adversaries to track the target vehicle.
4.5 Summary
This chapter presented an anonymity framework for VANET based on
the use of pseudonyms. The framework comprises as main elements
a Central Authority, the road side units (RSUs), and the vehicles them-
selves. A cooperation pseudonym changing scheme that involves vehi-
cle and RSUs both into system was proposed to make more reasonable
pseudonym change approach. In addition, the pseudonym request sys-
tem with digest of vehicle information provides non-reputation. The per-
formance results show the ability of the system to maintain a sufficiently
large anonymity set that is meant to confuse the attacker. The proposed
scheme can achieve nearly 20 % more anonymity set size in light traf-
fic congestion compared with the benchmark. Furthermore, the entropy,
degree of anonymity and success tracking ratio have been studied to
provide a comprehensive knowledge of privacy metrics evaluation. Al-
though the proposed scheme was evaluated to be effective through sim-
ulation, further optimisation works are required and summarised into
future work.
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Chapter 5
Decentralised Pseudonym
Management System Using
Distributed Ledger
Technology
A practical challenge is that many vehicular communication applications
and services make use of Basic Safety Messages that contain the infor-
mation of vehicle, location and other personal data. A popular way of
dealing with this privacy issue is to utilise a pseudonym change scheme
to protect the vehicle’s identity and location. From last chapter, a coop-
erative pseudonym change scheme is proposed. However, many such
schemes suffer that the computation cost grows and the pseudonym cer-
tificate management difficulty raises with the number of pseudonyms
generated and stored, casting doubt of the economic feasibility of that
approach. The cost here is not just bandwidth cost but also operating
cost. The bandwidth cost is link capacity between CA and relying par-
ties. The operating cost means the maintaining mapping of pseudonym
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and long term identity, issuing and renewing of pseudonym certificates.
Hence, existing pseudonym certificate management systems still left few
challenges to overcome. For instance, a popular solution called Security
Credential Management System (SCMS) [7] that was mentioned in previ-
ous Chapter proposes a large scale system which can support 300 billion
certificates per year for 300 million devices at full capacity. However,
this advantage also comes with a shortcoming: the system would have
large certificate revocation lists and would be difficult and inefficient to
achieve certificate revocation. The authors in [7] themselves illustrate the
method of SCMS is prohibitively expensive regarding to storage limita-
tions on the device (OnBoard Unit). In addition, the cost of generating
300 billion pseudonym certificates and related cryptography materials
tends to be very high (Based on commercial digital certificate seller, one
certificate costs around 15 British Pounds for encryption and signature
for a year [96]). Imaging generating such a large amount of certificates
with high cost, current standards and popular research schemes recom-
mend vehicles only use these certificates for a short period of time. There-
fore, it constitutes the motivation for the research development in this
chapter.
The concept of reusing pseudonym certificates has been discussed
in [6]. The authors proposed a distributed network structure and aims
to use roadside network to shuffle used pseudonym. The main chal-
lenges for pseudonym shuffling are the optimisation distribution prob-
lem and how to achieve enough randomness in terms of shuffling. Firstly,
it is very hard to provide a fully random shuffle plan without a spe-
cific central manager. Randomness plays an important role in privacy
technologies and cryptography. Secondly, although the paper claims us-
ing a multi-agent distributed optimisation algorithms for every RSU, the
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actual shuffle algorithm and RSU network consensus mechanism need
more evidence.
To tackle distribution optimisation problem in the shuffling process
without a central manager, the Pseudonym Management System Using
Distributed Ledger Technology is realised by using the Blockchain dis-
tributed consensus mechanism. The pseudonym shuffling results are
recorded in blocks (distributed ledger). The blockchain technology brings
robustness in the distributed structure. When a single point fails, the rest
would still continue to work. The method also provides randomness of
pseudonym shuffling and fully traceable record.
5.1 System Model
FIGURE 5.1: VCS Network Hierarchy
Nodes in VCS are hierarchically classified into four layers, based on
their responsibilities. There are three layers for the service providers,
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while the service user occupies a single layer [97]. As shown in fig-
ure5.1, the service provider comprises RSUs, PMs and Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI). The PMs and RSUs have wireless communication de-
vices which can communicate over the wireless medium, utilising VCS
communication standards (DSRC [16] and C-ITS [98]). RSUs act as ac-
cess points (APs) which offer interfaces to bridge messages between the
service provider and users. Moreover, each vehicle is required to be
equipped with a built-in computerised device known as an On-Board
Unit (OBU) – in order to support the VCS standards. A PKI contains
a Certificate Authority (CA), an Anonymity Server (AS) and other third-
party infrastructure that may support applications.
All the pseudonym-related cryptographic materials, such as anony-
mous credentials, key pairs and pseudonym certificates are created by
the PKI. Each PM has its own logical coverage area, called the security
domain. PMs help the PKI to manage cryptographic material of security
domains that are logically placed below the PKI layer. It is proposed to
install PMs in a geographically sparse manner, one for each security do-
main. Vehicles will transmit and receive safety messages with other ve-
hicles and RSUs. These safety messages are collected by RSUs installed
along roads at regular intervals in order to provide maximum network
coverage. A safety message includes a pseudonym, a timestamp, and
the current vehicle status – including speed, orientation, position, and
vehicle dimensions.
Vehicles carry a set of pseudonyms which are used under different
time periods in VCS communications. To guarantee privacy, vehicles
are supposed to use each pseudonym for only a short duration and fre-
quently switch to a new pseudonym. The US-based VCS standard SAE J2735
[57] defines pseudonym changes to take place within 120 seconds or after
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1 km distance travelled (whichever stays longer), while the EU standard
ETSI TS 102.867 [99] recommends changing pseudonyms every 5 min-
utes. The RSUs are equipped with the same network communication
technology and are fixed infrastructures with a certain communication
coverage area (e.g., a radius of 300 meters in DSRC protocols). The RSUs
relay messages between vehicles and PMs, which act as service providers
of VCS. To provide context, the traditional and blockchain-based network
structures are compared.
5.1.1 Traditional Network Structure
The traditional structure strictly follows the aforementioned hierarchy.
Security domains are areas managed by different PMs, and PKIs super-
vise the network at the top level. A PKI is a trusted authority that pro-
vides cryptographic keys, certificates, and long-term identity to all legiti-
mate nodes and infrastructures. Each PKI manages several PMs, as many
as are appropriate for the geographical topology of the area. Moreover,
PKIs act as bridges that connect different security domains.
PMs are introduced to cover the privacy-related function of VCS. The
PM can be seen as the Security Manager (SM) in [17], which has extended
privacy protection functions. The RSU is a stationary device placed along
roads and at intersections, which is used to gather information about the
road traffic and broadcasts it to the OBUs that are within communication
range. Also, an RSU can communicate with other RSUs and the CA to
exchange messages related to the road traffic through a secure channel.
The previous work [100] follows the traditional network structure as do
most other works, such as [65][60].
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FIGURE 5.2: Decentralised Structure
5.1.2 Blockchain Based Structure
The PMs manage a certain amount of RSUs based on the geographic dis-
tribution of RSUs, shown in figure5.2. In contrast to a traditional network
structure, a PKI is isolated and would be a part of an existing authority
such as a Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. The PKI is designed to
generate specific cryptographic credentials for all the nodes and to link
vehicles to their long-term identities. Cryptographic credentials – such
as vehicle identities, pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates – are sup-
posed to be kept in a secured facility to fulfil privacy and security require-
ments [101]. Thus the central managers are accessed in the following two
situations:
(i) Initial registration. New vehicles need to apply for initial registra-
tion when they leave the manufacturer and participate in a new security
domain for the first time. (ii) Adversary revocation. In the blockchain-
based structure, malicious behaviours are recognised through using blockchain
look-up. The identity (including pseudonyms) of the adversary is then
publicised, once the malicious behaviours have been confirmed.
As a result, the proposed blockchain-based structure could enable
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PMs to securely keep all communication logs without reliance on a cen-
tral party. All PMs are connected with each other and the PKI on a
domain. PMs communication mainly contains peer-to-peer pseudonym
sets exchange, encapsulated in transactions. Similar to Bitcoin, the ledger
keeps all transactions from the beginning. And PMs act as miners to
put transactions into a block within a fixed period of time. With this
blockchain-based structure, the system can reuse pseudonyms by shuf-
fling them between PMs. The shuffle results will be determined by the
first miner and be added to the block. Hence a blockchain can be main-
tained for the purposes of pseudonym management. Here are assump-
tions for the blockchain structure:
• (Assumption 1: Role of Miners) Generally speaking, nodes are clas-
sified into two roles according to different responsibilities among
the blockchain network, namely service user and miners. The min-
ers are nodes with powerful computation power who use their com-
putation power to maintain the blockchain. In the Bitcoin network,
nodes decide on their own whether or not they want to take on the
role of a miner. Bitcoin pays the miner who wins the mining race
for the next block a reward, in addition to transaction fees embed-
ded in that block. This creates incentives that ensure that mining
takes place, but also causes problems such as dramatic increases in
difficulty when Bitcoins become very valuable in fiat currencies.
In the blockchain-based scheme, all the block mining tasks are car-
ried out by all the PMs as procured resources, and so they do not
need any incentives and won’t necessarily receive rewards – as
discussed in [102], [103] previously. This is sensible in the set-
ting because pseudonym management, as part of ITS management,
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should be run by the appropriate organisation of the government
(e.g. the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency in the UK). All the
PMs take the roles of service user and miner at the same time. It
may also be attractive to use Proof of Kernel Mode [77] as a vari-
ant of Proof of Work that randomly and securely would select an
expected number of PMs for mining each time. This will then al-
low for using a lower level of difficulty and will save costs as only
those nodes selection for the next mining race will consume energy
in mining.
• (Assumption 2: Approximate Mining Synchronous) It is beneficial
to be able to ensure that all the PMs start mining tasks at approxi-
mately the same time. As the navigation service is contained in the
ITS applications, each vehicle should have a synchronised clock.
This helps to limit the deadline for each transaction collection in-
terval. Any lack of synchronous may also be contained by using a
combination of, for example, Proof of (Kernel) Work and Proof of
Elapsed Time, as discussed and modelled in [77].
• (Assumption 3: Consensus) Proof of Work is the only consensus
mechanism that has been tested successfully and in a sustained
manner in a highly adversarial environment, and is the only known
cryptographic puzzle that meets these testing requirements. Al-
ternative consensus mechanisms such as the ones aforementioned
have not yet been tested in real and adversarial practice. This is
why we favour PoW-style consensus given that an ITS is part of
a regional or national critical infrastructure that may be subject to
aggressive attacks, perhaps even facilitated by compromised insid-
ers. PoW gives us this resiliency even against corrupted PMs and
Chapter 5. Decentralised Pseudonym Management System Using
Distributed Ledger Technology
82
low levels of difficultly, especially when used with a Proof of Ker-
nel version of PoW, which give a balance of security and shorter
compute time at lower cost.
5.2 Threat Model
Due to fact that broadcast safety messages need to be sent, an eavesdrop-
per may track a specific vehicle and monitor its location information by
leveraging these periodic safety messages [104]. In this case, external and
internal attacks have been considered. The two types of external attacks
are global passive attack and local passive attack. The two types of internal
attacks are internal tricking attack and internal betrayal attack.
Global Passive Adversary (GPA). A global adversary has the overall cov-
erage of a connected vehicle network. This GPA can locate and track any
vehicle in any region of interest by eavesdropping its broadcast beacon
messages.
Local Passive Adversary (LPA). The local passive adversary is limited
in its location tracking capability in a region of interest, since it can only
exploit the deployed infrastructures for eavesdropping and estimating
locations of vehicle broadcasts. Hence, the region over which the LPA
can track vehicles is dependent on the vehicle transmission range.
Internal Betrayal Adversary (IBA). An internal adversary is a compro-
mised node that becomes an adversary in the network system. The in-
ternal attacker could spoof safety massages and collude with a global
passive attacker or local passive attacker to track a target vehicle. After
swapping or obtaining privacy-related information (e.g., the pseudonyms)
with the target vehicle, the malicious user can leak the information to the
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global passive attacker or local passive attacker to link the target’s loca-
tion and real identity.
Internal Tricking Adversary (ITA). Unlike the IBA, the internal tricking
adversary will use pseudonyms which have been allocated to others, al-
lowing it to confuse the vehicular network system and to attack other
nodes.
There are other methods for attacking the vehicular network system.
For example, accessing traffic monitoring cameras or hijacking the Global
Positioning System (GPS) allows tracking the target vehicle. Further-
more, adversaries may be able to compromise privacy managers to attach
a false block into the blockchain. Yet acquiring either of these capabilities,
access to a traffic monitor that controls national traffic operations centre
or taking control the blockchain itself, requires a significant effort – e.g.
having at least 51% of the total blockchain network’s processing power.
5.3 Pseudonym Management
The blockchain-based pseudonym management scheme intends to reuse
pseudonyms and address the distribution issue that decentralised sys-
tems have regarding pseudonym shuffling.
5.3.1 Pseudonym Distribution
From a management perspective, pseudonym sets for each car that are
presently stored in the OBU will be depleted. Authors in [6] mentioned
that the use of a backbone network of RSUs may resolve the aforemen-
tioned issues and reuse pseudonyms for a limited period of time and
in different geographic areas. However, the distributed nature of these
systems then creates an additional optimisation problem: it is hard to
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balance the volume of incoming and outgoing pseudonyms without a
centralised means of controlling this. This issue remains even when us-
ing distributed versions of the simplex algorithm in order to alleviate the
computational demands on the optimisation problem.
In terms of Privacy-by-Design for the VCS network, it is supposed to
consider pseudonym generation and distribution more wisely. Specifi-
cally, the number of pseudonyms generated by a PKI should be limited
but sufficiently large in order to meet demand. Two initialisation events
are introduced to finish the entire initialisation stage, namely the perma-
nent identity and pseudonym generation. The permanent identity con-
tains the identity number ID, a certificate CERT and key pairs (private
key SK and public key PK) which are used to prove the real node iden-
tity or the initial registration identity. These credentials are generated by
PKIs and distributed to the manufacturers who are responsible for pro-
ducing vehicles and the VCS infrastructure.
The distribution procedure between a PKI and manufacturers is fi-
nalised via highly secured connections, such as optical fibre or cable con-
nections. PKIs generate a certain number of pseudonyms offline and then
distribute pseudonym sets to each PM. Each pseudonym set {id1 · · · idn}
contains the corresponding pseudonym certificates {cert1 · · · certn} and
encryption private/public key pairs {sk1/pk1 · · · skn/pkn}. The number
of pseudonyms inside sets is determined by the density of traffic in cor-
responding areas which all RSUs reported to their PMs. Pseudonyms
will be encrypted and signed to maintain secrecy before a PKI distributes
them to PMs. The encryption and signing use the public key PKPM of the
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PM and secret key SKPKI of the PKI, respectively. To summarise:
i. Generates Permanent Identity :
PKI generates ID, CERT, SK & PK
ii. Distributes Permanent Identity :
PKI sends ID, CERT, SK & PK to Manufacturers :
{ID+CERT+SK+PK}secured channel
Manufacturers issues ID, CERT, SK & PK to Vehicles
or Infrastructures :
{ID+CERT+SK+PK} f ile trans f er
iii. Generates Pseudonyms :
PKI generates : {id1 · · · idn}, {cert1 · · · certn} and
{sk1/pk1 · · · skn/pkn}
iv. Distributes Pseudonyms :
PKI sends pseudonyms to PM :
{id1 · · · idn}PKPM+ {cert1 · · · certn}PKPM +
{sk1/pk1 · · · skn/pkn}PKPM+SignatureSKPKI
5.3.2 Pseudonym Shuffling
To keep sufficient pseudonyms to allow frequent changing across vehi-
cles, PMs are responsible for retrieving used pseudonyms and issuing
fresh pseudonyms. There are two challenges for this shuffling scheme:
(1) the path of pseudonym exchanges needs to be protected; otherwise,
the attacker could subject the path to further analysis in order to con-
strain the possible pseudonyms delivered to vehicles in certain RSUs’
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ranges. (2) the demand of pseudonym for each privacy manager is sup-
posed to be fulfilled. For instance, the PM covers central London would
need more pseudonyms than PMs in countryside because different lo-
cations have different traffic. The blockchain technology has been used
to deal with these challenges for pseudonym management, as it could
provide sufficient randomness on the shuffling path and enough compu-
tation power to tackle the distribution optimisation problem.
Algorithm.1 briefly describes the mechanism used when a vehicle
joins a mixed zone. Traffic junctions and roundabouts could be treated
as physical mixed zone where one RSU has been placed in each these
area, while traffic lights or other places at which enough vehicles could
gather in close proximity are seen as “virtual mixed zones”. In virtual
mixed zones, vehicles would trigger pseudonym change even when the
vehicles are on a highway with vehicles of a similar status (e.g., similar
speed, same heading, and so forth). A vehicle first cloaks its location in-
formation according to the specific cloaking algorithm of a mixed zone.
This aims to mix all vehicles so that the probability of tracking can be
minimised.
Initially, vehicles carry a set of pseudonyms installed at the time of ve-
hicle manufacture. A vehicle marks a pseudonym as “used” and switches
to a new one if the pseudonym meets its expiry conditions. The thresh-
old was defined for used pseudonym sets, a fixed percent of the number
of pseudonyms.
To assure the vehicle could have enough new pseudonyms to use af-
ter it gave up used pseudonyms, the threshold is set to cover the ma-
jority of pseudonyms but still remains few pseudonyms to use until re-
placement coming. The vehicle then encapsulates all used pseudonyms
into a package that it sends to the current RSU. Instead of sending used
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Algorithm 1 The Joining-Mixed-Zone Mechanism
Input: : Current PM id PMx, Public Key of PMx: PKx, used pseudonym set PNused, a
Mixed Zone area under managed by PMx, Location Cloaking Requirement of Mixed
Zone: Cloak{}, Current location Location
1: if (Vehicle enters a RSU covered junction or car park or roundabout ) then
2: Mixed Zone = True
3: else if (RSU detects 2 or more similar context vehicles in coverage enters a virtual
mixed zone) then
4: Mixed Zone = True
5: else
6: Mixed Zone = False
7: end if
8: if (Mixed Zone = True) then
9: Cloaks the location information Cloak{Location};
10: Broadcasts safety messages using cloaked location;
11: Encrypts pseudonym by PM’s public key: Enc{PNused}PKx ;
12: Sends Enc{PNused}PKx to PMx;
13: end if
14: End Algorithm
pseudonym one each time, this method reduces the transmission over-
head of the network in terms of packet headers and synchronisation times.
PMs will collect used pseudonym packages for a fixed period of time
from all RSUs that are situated in its range and then aggregate all pack-
ages into a single transaction. All packages and transactions are signed
by their senders and encrypted with the receiving PMs’ public keys. Hence
PMs could assure all pseudonyms are integrated and authenticated. Then
the PMs upload all used pseudonyms, related indexes, and the number
of pseudonyms in the PM cloud. After that, each PM in the network
will make a copy of all pseudonyms that have been uploaded for this
shuffle. Since every communication between PMs contains timestamps,
pseudonym shuffle will be triggered in every fixed interval. When pseudonym
shuffling commences, all PMs pull the demand of each PM from the
cloud and add those demands to their own list. The PMs will randomly
choose pseudonym sets and allocate them to every PM based on the num-
ber of required pseudonym sets. The shuffling algorithm is outlined in
Algorithm.2.
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Algorithm 2 The Pseudonym Shuffling Scheme
Input: : Current PM id PMx, Public Key of PMx: PKx, used pseudonym set PNn
1: for (x = 1; x 6 i; x++) do
2: PMx gathers all the used pseudonyms from mixed zones it manages;
3: PNPMx = {PNPMx1 · · · PNPMxnx };
4: Counts the number of used pseudonyms = nx;
5: Encapsulates PNPMx into package and sends into PM cloud network;
6: end for
7: for (x = 1; x 6 i; x++) do
8: PMx picks up all the pseudonym package within PM cloud network;
9: Shuffles the pseudonym sequence and relocates to destination PMs;
10: end for
11: All the PMs start Mining;
12: The mining winner broadcasts the Block into PM network;
13: for (x = 1; x 6 i; x++) do
14: Retrieves new pseudonyms for PMx;
15: end for
16: End Algorithm
TABLE 5.1: The Format of Forwarded Package
Package Header Payload
Type PM no. PN number Pseudonyms
Privacy PM1 n1 {PN
PM1
1 , PN
PM1
2 · · · PNPM1n1 }
Privacy PM2 n2 {PN
PM2
1 , PN
PM2
2 · · · PNPM2n2 }
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
Privacy PMi ni {PN
PMi
1 , PN
PMi
2 · · · PNPMini }
Table.5.1 illustrates an example of all the forwarded packages within
the PM cloud network of i many PMs, ranging from PM1 to PMi. The
first field in the package header indicates the type of this packet, used
for further extending the service to security applications. The remaining
fields in the header are the PM number {n1 · · · ni} and the number of
pseudonyms which are donated from the PM, respectively. The payload
field contains all the used pseudonyms PNPM.
An example of the shuffle mapping result is shown in Table.5.2. Here
is the assumption that random variables {a, b, c, d} ∈ [1, i] and aa ∈
[1, n1], bb ∈ [1, n2], cc ∈ [1, n3], dd ∈ [1, n4]. The first line means a PM
selects a previously-used pseudonym PNPMaaa from PMa. This source to
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destination result is marked by the sequence number 1. After creating
this list, each PM encapsulates its list into a Blockchain-based transac-
tion. Then PMs will try to mine for consensus, e.g. by calculating Proof of
Work (PoW). Whoever first finishes that mining race must add the mined
block into the Blockchain. All PMs will validate such a new block and, if
validated, follow the block’s description of how to allocate pseudonym
sets. Since each transaction is signed by the sending PM’s private key
and encrypted by the receiving PM’s public key, each transaction is only
visible to relative PMs. Even though all transactions are attached in the
block and the block was broadcast to all PMs, others who neither sent nor
received a specific transaction cannot obtain any information from that
transaction. Hence each PM can only decrypt its own transactions (for
which they were the receiver). So each PM will perform the pseudonym
shuffle by shuffling all pseudonym indexes individually. After each shuf-
fling, all PMs will delete all copies of pseudonym sets. The format of
transactions and the mining will be described next.
TABLE 5.2: Shuffle Mapping Table
Src Dest Seq no. Pseudonyms
PMa PM1 1 PN
PMa
aa
· · · PM1 · · · · · ·
PMb PM1 n1 PN
PMb
bb
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
PMc PMi
i
∑
k=1
nk − ni + 1 PNPMccc
· · · PMi · · · · · ·
PMd PMi
i
∑
k=1
nk PN
PMd
dd
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5.4 DLT Technologies
5.4.1 Transaction Format
The transaction ledger is designed to encapsulate pseudonym materials
from a source-privacy manager to a destination-privacy manager. An
example of the transaction ledger is shown in Table.5.2. In the ledger,
the left-hand side shows the source PM address and the destination PM
address, while the right-hand side includes the pseudonym sets of this
transaction and their corresponding credentials (e.g., key pairs and cer-
tificate). The data in each column of the payload on the right-hand side
of the table has been encrypted by the public key of the destination PM
PKPM−dest, which establishes the transaction’s integrity and confidential-
ity. Only the destination PM who has the private key PRPM−dest can de-
crypt this information. Messages are encrypted with the private key of
the source PM PRPM−sour. With the use of a digital signature, the en-
crypted transaction information can be prevented from spoofing attacks
and eavesdropping by malicious users – since they would need to forge
signatures.
Table.5.3 shows the format of each transaction in the ledger, contain-
ing transaction header and payload. In the transaction header, the num-
ber of this transaction specifies the position at which this transaction is
located in the ledger. The source and destination PM address are similar
to Bitcoin inputs and outputs seen in [37]. The signature occupies the last
position of the transaction to maintain the authentication, integrity, and
non-repudiation of key-transfer information. The cipherinfo has already
been discussed above.
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TABLE 5.3: The Format of Transaction
Transaction Header
Hashed result of the transaction
Number of this transaction in block
Current privacy manager address PM-sour
Destination privacy manager address PM-dest
Signature of this transaction to ensure integrity and authentication
Sig{CipherIn f o + PMdest}PRPM-sour
Payload: (Encrypted Transaction Information)
Cipherin f o = En{Pseudonym sets}PKPM−dest
5.4.2 Block Format
A block is designed to store all transactions as ledgers. All blocks need
to be joined to form a large chain — the blockchain. The format of a block
is shown in Table.5.4. The first row shows the block number, which is
the sequence number of the block within the entire chain. The hash of
the previous block securely links this block to its parent one through the
mining process. This makes is extremely hard to replace contiguous sub-
chains with other data and to convince other nodes of the validity of such
changes. The Merkle tree root is used for securing the integrity of trans-
actions within a block [105]: all transactions in this block are jointly au-
thenticated into the Merkle tree root, so that any alteration on any trans-
actions would cause a different value of Merkle root value. As in Bitcoin,
a timestamp was added to prove when this block of transactions was
created and to prevent time tampering. The fields for targeted difficulty
and nonce are designed for Proof of Work, which creates a digital receipt
of which first node mined that block. The mining process and Proof of
Work for the proposed scheme is described in the next section. The pay-
load field contains the aforementioned transactions that the block creator
randomly allocated.
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TABLE 5.4: The Format of Block
Block Header
Field Description
Version Block Version Number
Previous Block Hash Hash of the previous block in the chain
Merkle Tree Root Hash of the merkle tree root RootM
Timestamp Creation time of this block
Targeted Difficulty The Proof-Of-Work difficulty target
Nonce A counter for the Proof-Of-Work
Block Payload (Transactions)
Transaction No.1 · · · Transaction No.n
5.4.3 Consensus Mechanism
In blockchain-based applications, a cryptographically strong hash func-
tion is used to calculate the proof of work. In the proposed scheme, dou-
ble SHA-256 was used on the previous block hash result and the Merkle
tree with related time stamp of the new block as input to that hash func-
tion.
The proof of work involves adding some random information, a nonce
value, to that input until the resulting hash has a desired minimal num-
ber of leading 0 bits. Consequently, proof of work has several desirable
features. For example, a miner that has had k failed mining attempts has
no advantage in the k+ 1th attempt in comparison to another miner who
just begins its first attempt of solving PoW. Also, PMs are very likely
to have different mining times due to the exponential distribution for
the expected time to find proof of work within a certain period of time.
Also, all PMs randomly generate transactions that result in different root
hashes and that they all use the same hardware specification, making
this a blockchain system in which miners are procured resources as pro-
posed in [103]. Therefore, all PMs have the same probability of getting
the correct hash results within a certain period of time t, assuring the
randomness of the resulting shuffling.
Since all PMs contain identical processing modules and since they are
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assumed to link with highly secured wire connections, the level of diffi-
culty (the number of leading 0 bits in the hash output) required to be
rather low. This low level of difficulty allows for a short Proof of Work
computation time, resulting in an efficient yet resilient consensus mecha-
nism. While current bitcoin network difficulty is 13691480038694.45, the
difficulty of the proposed private blockchain is set in 100 so that min-
ers mines that block very fast. The hash rate is measured in hashes per
second, which is a general measure of the computation power of the
blockchain network. At the time of writing, the overall hash rate of bit-
coin network is sitting around 97,868,989 trillion hashes per second. So
given the network difficulty 13691480038694.45 results in around 10 min-
utes each to mine the block for the system. Since the proposed scheme
uses private blockchain, the less mining difficulty is required and faster
mining time needs to be achieved. An example of mining process on a
private blockchain is shown in the figure5.3. In the example, there are to-
tal 10 miners with identical hash rate 33.3 MHash/s and given difficulty
100 for the network, resulting in average 2 seconds to find a new block.
FIGURE 5.3: An Example of Mining in Private Blockchain
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5.5 Time Consumption
TABLE 5.5: The Time Elements of Processing Procedures
Parent Field Description of Parent Field Child Field Description of Child Field
tprep
trand Calculation time to generate random transactions
The time cost to prepare block tfill Time cost to insert transactions into the block message
which will be mined later tmerkle Calculation time to get Merkle Tree Root
theader Processing time to prepare block header
ttransfer Transmission time cost in PM network tP Propagation time in network cable
tprocessing Processing time for message Verification tV Processing time to verify signature
tmining Mining time for shuffle process tM The average time to mining a block
Table.5.5 demonstrates each time factor for the shuffling process. The
variable tprep is the time needed for preparing a block, including the PM’s
generation of a randomised transaction ledger and the time cost of block
preparation. Denote that N the number of PMs. To calculate the total
time cost of the shuffling process, we also need the number of transac-
tions (nT ∈ R) where R is a set of all possible number of transactions.
Given that,
R = 2× (n− 1)× n (5.1)
where n ∈ Z∗ and Z∗ = {0} ∪Z+. Z+ denotes the positive integers.
Hence the total time cost can be described as:
tB = nT × tV + 2× tP + tprep + tM (5.2)
So the total time cost can be expressed as seen in equation (5.2), that
contains all time factors. Note that the total transaction verification time
(nT × tV) depends on the number of transactions (nT). The preparation
time and mining time are added to reflect the time needed for creating a
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block in the blockchain.
5.6 Performance Evaluation
5.6.1 Scenario Design
The simulation of the pseudonym management scheme was carried out
using OMNET++ with the dedicated simulation package (Veins and PREXT)[89].
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)[106] with elliptic
curve secp160r1 in Crypto++ [107] is selected not only for cryptographic
scheme ECIES, but also for the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) as well. The proposed scheme was simulated on the desktop
computer equipped with an Intel Core i7, 8 GB RAM, and a display card
Inter HD Graphics 530. The simulation considered 300 vehicles. All ve-
hicles followed the pseudonym change scheme of the proposed system.
The traffic density was set at 50 vehicles per kilometre and the trans-
mission range of the target at 50 meters based on [6], [100]. The perfor-
mance results are broken into three parts. Firstly, the pseudonym reuse
frequency was evaluated. Then the degree of anonymity was studied
compared to other existing schemes. Lastly, the time cost of the entire
process was investigated.
5.6.2 Privacy Attacks and Defence Analysis
Researchers such as Yu in [108] state that the power of identity and lo-
cation privacy preservation in pseudonym-based systems is determined
by the unpredictability of mapping temporary identifiers (pseudonyms)
to vehicular permanent identities. Accordingly, the blockchain based
pseudonym-management system aims to improve the unpredictability
of pseudonym mixtures while at the same time reducing the cost and
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effort of constantly generating new pseudonym certificates by shuffling
used pseudonyms. Privacy attacks pose a serious issue in current ITS that
require addressing. Without proper identity and location-privacy preser-
vation, attacks, such as vehicle tracking, location manipulating and so
forth could cause serious damage to vehicles and compromise the safety
of human actors. Moreover, the lack of such abilities will hinder the de-
velopment and acceptability of the Internet of Connected Vehicles.
In the following, it shows how the approach can address some perti-
nent attacks and the defence measures.
Global Passive Adversary and Local Passive Adversary
The most common privacy attack is when an adversary passively eaves-
drops vehicles’ beacon messages. Other than the difference of cover-
age, both GPA and LPA could obtain the timestamps and location of
the joining and leaving of vehicles in order to derive a likelihood dis-
tribution over possible mappings. As mentioned in Chapter 3, several
works claim that they can predict vehicles’ trajectories with a brute-force
collection of beacon messages even when vehicles change pseudonyms
frequently. In contrast, the proposed system not only allows vehicles to
change pseudonyms simultaneously at a mixed zone, but also at the vir-
tual mixed zone where RSU detects 2 or more similar context vehicles in
coverage as defined in Algorithm 1. In this case, for both GPA and LPA,
the unpredictability of mapping vehicles is accumulated.
Internal Betrayal Adversary and Internal Tricking Adversary
As already stated above, this chapter focuses on two specific internal ad-
versaries, namely internal betrayal adversary and internal tricking adver-
sary. Whenever the internal betrayal adversary (IBA) obtains a pseudonym
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of the target vehicle, it is able to perform privacy attacks on vehicles (e.g.,
to manipulate safety messages with the temporary identity of the target
vehicle) or share the information to the global passive adversary so that
the pseudonym of the target vehicle could be mapped to its real identity.
In contrast, the proposed scheme prevents the IBA from accessing oth-
ers’ pseudonyms simply, as vehicles will not exchange pseudonyms with
each other. According to the pseudonym change scheme of the proposed
system, vehicles only update pseudonyms from their own pseudonym
sets which have been allocated by the RSUs (not vehicles). After acquir-
ing a new pseudonym set from the RSU, the vehicle cannot retrieve the
original source of the new pseudonyms in that set. Therefore, the IBA
could not obtain any useful information from its surrounding or related
vehicles.
In terms of ITA, the malicious user will keep and repetitively use
pseudonyms that have been uploaded to RSUs and allocated to other
vehicles. While other vehicles are using the same ones, the ITA could use
the pseudonyms to confuse the vehicular network system and launch
other attacks. To deal with this problem, the system behaves as follows.
If the adversary stays in the current RSU’s coverage, the RSU will realise
that the adversary keeps using the old pseudonyms. Then the RSU will
mark the vehicle as adversarial and broadcast this information to other
vehicles. If the adversary leaves the RSU’s coverage, no one other than
a CA could know that the attacker is a ITA, due to the feature of the
blockchain based shuffling system: each PM will only recognise its own
related pseudonym shuffle routes from transactions of the block and will
not be able to see (unencrypted) other transactions in the block. So RSUs
and PMs will not know the allocation of each pseudonym and also could
not decide whether the adversary is using false pseudonyms. However,
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once the attacker launches other attacks in the false pseudonyms, such
as spoofing messages, that can be detected, the CA will retrieve trans-
actions of the blockchain. Hence it can spot the adversary and perform
revocation of original credentials.
Compromised PM
The privacy manager is a crucial part of this pseudonym-management
system. Therefore, PMs are relatively secure, most likely run and main-
tained by government agencies or similar governing bodies. In addi-
tion, blockchains are well known for providing high robustness and for
being hard to manipulate by an adversary. However, let us consider a
worse circumstance in which one PM is compromised by a malicious
user. There are several attack scenarios that may be enabled by this.
However when a PM is compromised or has lost connection with the
blockchain network, the whole blockchain will discard the PM after re-
peated failed attempts to acquire its response. In addition, all pseudonym
sets that this PM received from previous round pseudonym shuffles will
be abandoned from the PKIs and will thus not be used again. In addi-
tion to multiple compromised PMs, the blockchain technique provides a
strong and robust network. Due the nature of blockchain, multiple failed
PMs could not easily take over the control of the network as long as 51
% of nodes in the networks are still trusted. Otherwise, the adversaries
need a significant effort to have at least 51% of the total blockchain net-
work’s processing power.
Spoofing Block Attack
The spoof block attack assumes that a privacy manager (PM) has been
compromised or betrayed so that it is broadcasting false blocks into the
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blockchain cloud. Then an adversary can re-arrange pseudonym alloca-
tions and manipulate vehicles’ identity. But in order to consistently send
out forged blocks and to have them accepted by the blockchain network,
the compromised PM will need to have at least 51 % computation power
of the total blockchain based network since Proof of Work is used as con-
sensus mechanism. Otherwise, this PM will not be able to control the
mining process and so won’t be able to determine the history and future
of the blockchain.
5.6.3 Simulation Results
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FIGURE 5.4: The percentage of pseudonyms re-usage vs.
pseudonym reused time
Firstly, the pseudonym reuse frequency is studied to demonstrate
shuffling effectiveness. Each vehicle carry 10 pseudonyms with a thresh-
old setting of 8, meaning whenever a vehicle has 2 unused pseudonyms it
will upload 8 used pseudonyms to its RSU. The scenarios were simulated
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in which the shuffling process happens 50, 100 and 200 times. Figure5.4
shows the percentage of how many pseudonyms have been reused over
1, 2 and 3 times respectively. As can be seen from the graph, 60% of the
pseudonyms have been reused at least once when the shuffling process
performs 200 times. In addition, there is a significant drop in the fre-
quency of reused pseudonyms when the number of used times increases.
Hence the results of pseudonym reuse frequency indicate that the pro-
posed scheme assures pseudonyms could be reused in different locations
in limited shuffling iterations. Despite the fact that the increased reuse
times of each pseudonym could free up more storage for OBU, the re-
sults also show that the number of pseudonym reuse times affects the
percentage of reused pseudonyms. Only 0.15% of the pseudonyms have
been reused over 3 times in 50 shuffling iterations.
Pseudonym Total Amount
To quantify the efficiency of reusing pseudonyms, we compare the total
amount of pseudonyms that the proposed system needs for a 24-hour pe-
riod with the ETSI standard [24] for the change frequency. Since the ETSI
standard suggests vehicles change pseudonyms every 5 minutes, one ve-
hicle needs 288 pseudonyms for 24 hours. For the proposed scheme, de-
note that the capacity of storing pseudonyms of each vehicle is X. The
number of pseudonyms depends on X. The first case that was consid-
ered is the capacity of storing pseudonyms X ranges from 0 to 100 and
compare how many pseudonyms they would consume within 24 hours.
The comparison of the total amount of pseudonyms of 300 hundred
vehicles for one day is shown in figure 5.5. As can be seen from that
figure, the proposed scheme would use 30, 000 pseudonyms even with a
storage capacity of 100 pseudonyms based on Totalconsum1 = 100 ∗ 300,
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FIGURE 5.5: Total number of pseudonym comparison in
a day.
whereas the suggestion of the ETSI standard would consume over 85, 000
pseudonyms each day based on Totalconsum2 = 12 ∗ 24 ∗ 300.
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FIGURE 5.6: Total number of pseudonym comparison for
300 vehicles storing up to 100 pseudonyms
Then the situation was considered in which each vehicle is able to
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FIGURE 5.7: Relative anonymity levels with different
value of k neighbours.
store 100 pseudonyms, and compare how many pseudonyms they would
consume in duration T from 0 to 72 hours. Figure 5.6 shows the total
consumption of pseudonyms compared to the system duration. The con-
sumption of the system compliant with the ETSI standard increases lin-
early based on total = 12 ∗ T ∗ 300 and reaches around 260, 000. In con-
trast, the usage of our proposed scheme is not affected by duration and
stays at 30, 000. Hence, our proposed system significantly reduces the
consumption of pseudonyms.
Anonymity Set Size
In this simulation, the shuffle has been processed 200 times, based on the
results of pseudonym reuse frequency above, in order to achieve higher
performance and more accurate results. Figure 5.7 indicates the influ-
ence of the k neighbours on the relative anonymity level. The size of
anonymity set is a measure of the level of anonymity provided by the
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cloaking algorithm, normalised by the level of anonymity. Note that the
relative anonymity level cannot go below 1. Higher relative anonymity
level mean that messages are anonymous with larger k values than the
user-specified minimum k-anonymity levels. As can be seen, we com-
pare the proposed scheme with the coordinated silent period (CSP) scheme
and with the cooperative pseudonym change (PCN) scheme that has
been mentioned in the discussion of related work [50], [109]. CSP pro-
poses a approach that all vehicles in certain area completely cease any
communication and changes its pseudonym for a period of time to max-
imise the anonymity. PCN illustrates that the target wait till k neigh-
bours around to change pseudonyms together. Moreover, the relative
anonymity has been evaluated using k anonymity [90], compared with
benchmarks. The proposed scheme shows a relative anonymity level of
1.9 for vehicles with k = 2, meaning that on the average these vehicles are
anonymised with k = 3.8 by the algorithm. The CSP achieved a relative
anonymity level of around 1.7 with neighbours k =2. The higher the k
value is, the better the protection one can achieve against linking attacks.
This gap between proposed scheme and benchmarks vanishes for vehi-
cles with k = 6. This is the case since it is less probable to find greater
or identical k neighbouring vehicles when the value of k becomes large.
When k is set to 6, the anonymity set sizes of all three schemes are equal
to 1, which means that vehicles can only find less than k neighbours.
5.6.4 Pseudonym Request Delay
Figure. 5.8 illustrates the pseudonym request delay compared between
the proposed scheme and the traditional pseudonym management rec-
ommended in ETSI [24]. The results are based on the processing time
in [99]. The total request delay of the proposed scheme Totblockchain =
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TimeEncryption +TimeVeri f ication +Timev2r +Timer2pm, while the benchmark
request delay Totbenchmark = (TimeEncryption +TimeDecryption +TimeVeri f ication +
TimeSigning) ∗ 2+ Timev2r + Timer2c. Denoted that Timev2r is transmission
delay between vehicle to RSU, and Timer2c is the transmission delay be-
tween RSU to CA. In DPMS, vehicles send their new pseudonym request
while they upload used pseudonyms to the RSU. And the RSU relay the
request to local privacy manager to alleviate the congestion burden in
the network between RSU and CA. Localised processing pseudonym re-
quest could lessen the response time and round-trip delay. Therefore,
the proposed scheme has better performance about pseudonym request
delay. With the growth of the amount of vehicles, the advantage of the
proposed scheme is clearer. The proposed scheme is nearly 40% less than
that of the traditional structure, when the number of vehicles reaches 100.
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FIGURE 5.9: The total time cost regarding to transaction
numbers
Processing Time
We illustrate the total processing time of the proposed scheme. We ac-
quire each time component from Table.5.5 and calculate the result of total
time cost based on equation (5.2). As can be seen in figure.5.9, the total
time increases when the transaction number grows. Due to the benefits
that come with the design of privacy managers, the transaction num-
ber is limited as equation (5.1) demonstrated. Therefore, the total shuffle
process time stays within a reasonably short period. The total shuffle
time increases exponentially against the amount of transactions. For in-
stance, we take a medium size city as an example. We assume 30 pri-
vacy managers are placed in the city, and each of them covers several
RSUs. Based on equation (5.1), the number of transactions can be less
than 100 in off-peak hours, while the maximum number could exceed
1000 in peak hours. The processing time is just over 0.5 when transaction
numbers reach 400. The total processing time varies from 0.2 seconds for
100 transactions to over 2 seconds for 1,000 transactions.
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5.7 Summary
we have proposed a novel decentralised pseudonym-management scheme
for the VCS that makes use of a blockchain based on Proof of Work
in order to make the overall system more resilient to known privacy
and security attacks. The proposed scheme provides a method to ef-
fectively manage pseudonyms from distribution and re-utilisation, and
a pseudonym change-scheme that combines physical mixed zones with
virtual mixed zones. The paper discussed several types of vehicle pri-
vacy attacks and defence measures that are enabled by the proposed
blockchain-based system. We used OMNET++ and Veins to quantita-
tively evaluate the proposed scheme. The simulated pseudonym reuse
frequency and total amount of pseudonym consumption corroborate that
the proposed scheme can be used in Connected Vehicular Networks and
that it could significantly reduce the cost of pseudonym related gener-
ation and maintenance of credentials. Moreover, the simulation results
show that the scheme achieves better anonymity than existing schemes
when the shuffling process on pseudonyms is performed 200 times. The
total pseudonym usage for 3 days of the proposed scheme could save
nearly 90 % compared with ESTI recommended standards. In addition,
a total process time is computed which shows that the scheme is capable
of performing pseudonym shuffling with over 1, 000 blockchain transac-
tions in 2 seconds.
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Chapter 6
Distributed Pseudonym
Certificate Revocation Scheme
for VCS Using Distributed
Digital Ledger
As discussed in Chapter 5, the pseudonym certificate could be reused
based on distributed ledger technology. When it comes to a large scale
Vehicular Communication System which has millions of vehicles (e.g. a
system for UK), certificates management is still a big issue remaining.
In Chapter 4 and 5, we have taken care of pseudonym certificate gen-
eration, distribution and reallocation. However, vehicles in VCS may
misbehave and cause serious safety issue on the road. Misbehaving or
defective vehicles could send malicious v2x safety messages that contain
false or misleading information. So that normal participants on the road
should ignore messages from misbehaving vehicles. Therefore, certifi-
cate revocation plays a crucial role in order to prevent misuse and abuse
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of pseudonym certificates, and inform normal users to be aware of ma-
licious vehicles. This chapter proposes a novel certificate management
protocols.
6.1 Distributed Certificate Revocation Scheme
6.1.1 System Model
FIGURE 6.1: Blockchain Structure of Certificate Revoca-
tion Scheme
Based on the same structure that proposed in Chapter 5, the nodes
could be hierarchically categorised into four layers, Namely Public key
infrastructures (PKI), middle layer infrastructures, road side access points
(AP) and vehicles. Three out of four layers are fixed infrastructures, nor-
mally control and run by the service providers. The service providers
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have PKIs, Privacy Managers (PM), and Road Side Unit (RSU), shown
in Fig.6.1. The PKI here act as the central manager including Certifi-
cate Authority (CA), Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) and other man-
agement infrastructures to support related applications. PKI is isolated
and would be a part of an existing authority such as a Driver and Vehicle
Licensing Agency in UK. The PKI is designed to generate specific cryp-
tographic credentials. Cryptographic credentials – such as vehicle identi-
ties, pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates – are supposed to be kept
in a secured facility to fulfil privacy and security requirements [101]. The
LEA manages the mapping between the pseudonyms and the long term
vehicle identities (VID) for each vehicle and identifies all pseudonym sets
of malicious nodes based on accountability report. Thus the PKIs are ac-
cessed in the following two situations: (i) Initial registration. New vehicles
need to apply for initial registration when they leave the manufacturer
and participate in a new security domain for the first time. (ii) Certifi-
cate Revocation. In the blockchain-based structure, malicious behaviours
are recognised through using blockchain look-up. The identity (includ-
ing pseudonyms) of the adversary is then publicised, once the malicious
behaviours have been confirmed. Vehicles are supposed to send mes-
sages with pseudonym instead of real VID. Therefore a compromised
user could use its pseudonym to launch malicious behaviours. To elim-
inate the negative effect of the malicious behaviours, the VCS system
needs to revoke all the pseudonym certificates which belong to the com-
promised user. The mapping relationships between the permanent iden-
tity and the pseudonym sets are stored in the PKI, specifically LEA. Thus
the certificates (pseudonym and permanent certificates) of the adversary
is publicised once the malicious behaviours have been confirmed.
Similar with previous pseudonym shuffling scheme, PMs are edge
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nodes logically below the PKI layer, in order to assist PKI to manage cryp-
tography materials. Each PM covers its own logical area. Therefore, PMs
are deployed in a geographically sparse manner to handle each individ-
ual domain. Furthermore, RSUs in each PM domain play the role of Ac-
cess Points (AP). They provide interfaces to bridge the message between
service provider and vehicles. As a result, the proposed Blockchain based
structure could enable PMs to distributed shuffling the pseudonym and
PKI is capable of keeping the newest mapping between the pseudonym
and the permanent identity. All PMs are connected with each other and
the PKI on a domain. PMs communication mainly contains pseudonym
shuffling and CRL updating. Similar to Bitcoin application, the ledger
keeps all transactions from the beginning and is visible to all PMs. Apart
from this, all PMs play the role of miners in exchange for accessing the
VCS security and privacy services. With this Blockchain based structure,
the proposed system could obtain the latest CRL in the shortest possible
time since the PKI provides the pseudonym certificates from the latest
identity mapping. Finally, the newest CRL is distributed by RSUs to the
vehicle nodes.
6.1.2 System Initialisation
PKI initialises the system by establishing all the cryptographic materi-
als, include permanent identity, permanent key pairs, pseudonym sets.
it is assumed these credentials are generated by PKIs and distributed to
car manufacturers and equipment manufacturers which are responsible
to produce vehicles and VCS infrastructures, respectively. All the nodes
have their own vehicle id (VID). Each VID contains the identity num-
ber IDx, certificate CERTx and key pairs (private key SKx and public key
PKx) which are used to prove the real node identity, where x is the node
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name. The distribution procedure between PKI and manufacturers is fi-
nalised via highly secured connections, such as optical fibre connections.
PKIs generate a certain number of pseudonyms offline and then dis-
tribute pseudonym sets to each PM. Each pseudonym set {id1 · · · idn}
contains the corresponding pseudonym certificates {cert1 · · · certn} and
encryption private/public key pairs {sk1/pk1 · · · skn/pkn}.
6.1.3 Pseudonym Shuffling
In the proposed Blockchain structure, PMs are responsible to retrieve the
’used’ pseudonym sets and reallocate these pseudonym sets. When vehi-
cles running on the road, they will frequently exchange pseudonym fol-
lowed by the pseudonym changing algorithm. The pseudonym changing
is supposed to execute within mixed zones which is a geographic region
within the VCS environment. Generally speaking, the mixed zone must
be selected carefully to maximise the privacy level. For example, traf-
fic junction, roundabout and temporary car park will help a lot to mix
the privacy related messages by containing a large number of similar sta-
tus vehicles. The chapter 4 introduces Cooperative Pseudonym Change
Scheme (CPCS) aims to mix all the vehicle so that the tracking probability
can be minimised. To summarise the pseudonym shuffling from Chapter
5, there are 3 steps:
1. A vehicle changes to a new pseudonym set and marks the previ-
ously enabled pseudonym set as ’used’ if the pseudonym set meets
its expiry conditions. Upon joining the next mixed zone, the vehicle
encapsulates all the used pseudonym sets into a package and sends
to the current PM via an RSU.
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2. PMs will collect used pseudonym sets for a fixed period of time
and then aggregate all the pseudonyms in a single package. All
the packages are signed by the private key SKPM of the sender and
broadcast to the PM network, hence PMs could assure all pseudonyms
are integrity checked and authenticated. These packages are shared
within the PM network and each PM temporary stores a copy of
the pseudonym sets in the packages. The stored pseudonym sets
are deleted after the pseudonym shuffling finished.
3. Due to the fact that every communication between PMs contains
timestamps, pseudonym shuffling will be triggered in a fixed inter-
val. When pseudonym shuffling starts, each PM proposes a method
about the pseudonym reallocation plan and the reallocated pseudonym
sets with same destination PMs are encapsulated into a single trans-
action. The pseudonym sets are represented by indices in order to
reduce the size of the messages. PMs start the consensus mining
algorithm afterwards. Whoever first finishes the mining process
must add the mined block into the Blockchain. The PMs know the
shuffling results from the transactions in the mined block. Pseudonym
sets are picked according to the indices in the transactions. Finally,
PMs delete the temporarily stored pseudonym sets in step (ii) to re-
lease the storage space. The shuffling algorithm is demonstrated in
Algorithm. 2.
6.1.4 Certificate Revocation
Infrastructure Level
Based on the pseudonym shuffling scheme, the used pseudonym sets
collected from PM nodes are sent to PM cloud so that PMs can propose
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FIGURE 6.2: Message Handshake of Pseudonym Shuffle
Mining
new pseudonym allocation plan. According to the proposed network
structure, PKI is placed in a relatively isolated environment, but it is
still connected with PM network and able to receive messages from PM
cloud. The pseudonym shuffling results are stored in new blocks and
new blocks are broadcasted back to the network.
The PKI also captures the mined block after the mined block broad-
casted into network, as shown in Fig.6.2. Due to the fact that PKI has the
knowledge of all the cryptographic materials of the network, it is capable
of decrypting the transactions and view the reallocation results. It is as-
sumed that PKI maintains an identity mapping table between the VIDs
of nodes and the corresponding pseudonym sets. The identity mapping
table is updated based on the pseudonym shuffling plans inside the new
blocks so that the latest pseudonym set owner-ships are recorded. The
updated mapping table is then distributed to PMs which have a chance
to contact the malicious vehicles. Similar to the pseudonym shuffling
mining processes, the updated mapping table is then added to the blocks
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and distributed via Blockchain to PMs which have a chance to contact
the malicious vehicles. By processing the above procedures, the account-
ability function can be realised along with the pseudonym shuffling and
the CRL can be distributed using only one broadcast message.
FIGURE 6.3: Original Mapping Table between VID and
Pseudonyms
FIGURE 6.4: Upload the Used Pseudonyms
FIGURE 6.5: Reallocation Transaction for PM1
Here it is illustrated an example of how PKI updates the mapping be-
tween VIDs and pseudonym sets by hearing the information inside the
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mined block. The example is based on the following three assumptions:
(i) There are three vehicles are currently with the mixed zone which are
managed by PM1. These vehicles have long-term vehicle identities ID1,
ID2 and ID3, respectively. (ii) Each vehicle sends out three pseudonym
sets which are marked as ’used’. (iii) The volume of the pseudonym set
pool in OBUs on the vehicles is set to store maximum five pseudonym
sets. These assumptions are just used to assist the expression of the ex-
ample but not stand the practice situations. The example is shown from
figure 6.3 to figure 6.6. As it can be seen from figure 6.3, the original map-
ping table is analogous to a lookup table connecting between vehicle IDs
and allocated pseudonym sets. So any IDs in the mapping table could
be easily tracked with which pseudonyms they are with. Then three ve-
hicles are asked to exchange their used pseudonym sets. Each vehicle
gives away three pseudonym sets in this example, the used pseudonyms
for three vehicles are shown in figure 6.4. The PM network executes the
pseudonym shuffling and the final reallocation plan is shared in the form
of a mined block. Then PKI received the block and decrypted the transac-
tion. The transaction information of PM1 new pseudonym sets is demon-
strated in figure 6.5. Last but not the least, the mapping table in PKI sub-
stitutes the used pseudonym sets with the reallocated pseudonym sets
FIGURE 6.6: The Updated Mapping Table
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for each vehicle, as illustrates in figure 6.6. As a result of this process,
the ID mapping table in PKI will update the pseudonym information per
shuffling process. Now the PKI get the latest identity mapping infor-
mation. A CRL can be sent from PKI to PM1 and its neighbour PMs, if
any vehicle in the area of PM1 involving in malicious behaviours (e.g.
PM0 and PM2 shown in figure ref). CRL distributed directionally aims
to inform PMs which have the opportunity to receive the messages from
malicious vehicles, so that could reduce transmission overhead and more
efficiently distribute CRL to specific areas.
Accountability Report
To realise the certificate revocation function, the revocation system should
have a mechanism to report the malicious behaviour to the PKI. RSUs in
[73], [110] are designed to send a dedicated message to PKI in order to
report the malicious actions. Alternatively, it is proposed to embed the
accountability report function within either the key management scheme
in [17] or the pseudonym shuffling scheme, aiming to reduce the commu-
nication overhead. Based on the above idea, PM encounter communica-
tions with the PM network under two situations: (i) The system needs
to shuffle the pseudonym sets to protect privacy. (ii) The system has
key handover requirements. Consider VCS covers multiple security do-
mains and large number of vehicle nodes, these two situations happen
frequently (no less than one times per second [17]). The proposed ac-
countability report mechanism starts with the initial malicious behaviour
detection. PM waits for the next communication opportunity with the
PM network before sends out all the collected malicious report. Finally,
the PKI receives the reports and starts the CRL distribution task. A com-
plete certificate revocation procedures are displayed in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 3 The Certificate Revocation Procedures For PKI and PMs
1: For PKI:
2: Listen messages in the PM network;
3: if New block comes in the PM network: then
4: Update mapping between VID and pseudonym sets
5: else if New messages contains report of malicious behaviours then
6: Look up the mapping of the malicious users;
7: Prepare the updated CRL;
8: Locates PMs around the malicious users;
9: Sends CRL→ PM;
10: end if
11: For PM:
12: Listen messages from PM network and RSUs;
13: if New messages contains report of malicious behaviours then
14: Packet the report into package with other messages;
15: if New time slot of forwarding messages starts then
16: Forward the package to PM network;
17: end if
18: end if
19: End Algorithm
6.2 Performance Analysis
The performance analysis of the proposed revocation Scheme is carried
out by simulations. The simulations launch the revocation process to
produce the evaluation results. The performances are quantified by mea-
suring the system efficiency comparing with the benchmark. The per-
formance analysis has two parts, namely, processing time and overhead.
The processing time contains the handshake processing time to complete
accountability and revocation. It is evaluated the message overhead and
compare it with traditional structure. The CRL distribution overhead
benchmarks are from X.509 [69] and advanced X.509 CRL in [111].
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6.2.1 Certificate Revocation List Size
The CRL size in the X.509 CRL [70] defines that each entry in the ’Re-
voked Certificates’ field consists of 39 bytes, including a long serial num-
ber of revoked certificate, revocation date and revocation reason for 6
bytes, 13 bytes and 12 bytes, respectively. The mandatory fixed fields in
X.509 CRL occupies 400 bytes, according to [111]. This CRL is initially
broadcasted to the infrastructures (PM or RSU) and next distributed to
vehicles via RSU access points. An optimised X.509 CRL scheme in [111]
proposes to compress the size of mandatory fixed fields in X.509 CRL so
that only 39 bytes are needed for each revocation element. Based on the
pseudonym shuffling and certificate revocation algorithms 1 and algo-
rithms 2, PMs use the indices to reduce the message size. Moreover, the
mandatory fixed fields are removed since the CRLs only circulate among
the VCS infrastructure network which consists of trust nodes. This chap-
ter refers to the information size in [70], each certificate index requires 6
bytes (the long serial number). The CRL in the Blockchain based scheme
is only distributed among VCS infrastructures. Therefore, the total size
of X.509 based CRL schemes and the proposed CRL can be calculated as
follows, it is assumed nrevoked is the number of revoked certificates:
X.509 CRL Size = (400+ nB × 39)bytes
Optimised X.509 CRL size = nB × 38bytes
Blockchain Based scheme CRL size = nB × 6bytes
(6.1)
As it can be seen from the equation 6.1, the X.509 and the optimised
X.509 scheme [111] only have a small margin in terms of the CRL size
as it deletes some redundancy fields in the CRL header. So the opti-
mised X.509 CRL scheme is treated as benchmark to compare with the
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FIGURE 6.7: CRL Size Among Infrastructures Against
Vehicle Number in 5% Revocation Rate
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FIGURE 6.8: CRL Size Among Infrastructures Against
Vehicle Number in 10% Revocation Rate
proposed scheme. The sizes of optimised X.509 CRL in [111] and the
CRL in Blockchain based scheme are shown in figure 6.7 and figure 6.8
regarding to different number of vehicles and certificate revocation rates.
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The upper and the lower amounts of the vehicle are considered between
50,000 to half million, which is considered to cover most traffic condi-
tions. Two revocation rate, 10 % and 5%, are assumed to provide a var-
ious number of revocation requests. Figure 6.8 shows CRL sizes among
infrastructure network, the proposed scheme decreases the CRL size sig-
nificantly comparing to the optimised X.509 CRL scheme. The results of
X.509 CRL sizes are approximately eight times of the results in blockchain
based scheme which is because the X.509 CRL introduces too many pro-
file fields, such as mandatory fields, reason code and revocation proof
[111].
6.2.2 Revocation Overhead
FIGURE 6.9: Handshake Procedures Of The Certificate
Revocation Schemes
A comparison of the communication handshake procedures between
the X.509 CRL, optimised X.509 CRL and the Blockchain based certifi-
cate revocation scheme is shown in figure 6.9. In the traditional X.509
certificate revocation scheme and the optimised X.509 CRL scheme in
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[111], a report about the malicious behaviour is sent to the PKI to check
and prepare the CRL. PKI sends back the updated CRL to RSUs through
PM. Finally RSUs are responsible for distributing the CRL to vehicles, as
shown in figure 6.9(a). In figure 6.9(b), different from the X.509 scheme,
the Blockchain based scheme embeds the malicious report within the
other service messages which are sent to PM network by PMs. Due to the
fact that the message overhead increases linearly in terms of the growing
number of revocation broadcast, the Blockchain based certificate revoca-
tion scheme reduces one-third of the message overheads comparing to
the X.509 based schemes among the infrastructure level.
The message overhead for the infrastructure is shown in Table 6.1,
it can be seen the X.509 based scheme cost an extra handshake step on
the infrastructure level in order to report the malicious behaviour to PKI,
while the Blockchain based scheme removes this step by meriting the
report with other messages.
TABLE 6.1: The Overhead Comparison
Scenario Scheme Overhead/CRL Distribution
Infrastructure Level
X.509 CRL (Fig.6.9 (a)) 3 Broadcasts
Optimised X.509 [111] (Fig. 6.9 (a)) 3 Broadcasts
Blockchain Based CRL (Fig. 6.9 (b)) 2 Broadcasts
6.2.3 Processing Time
Based on the message handshake procedures in Fig.6.9, in order to assure
message integrity and authenticity, each message exchange involves sig-
nature verification, signature generation, ciphertext decryption and en-
cryption. Table 6.2 records the time cost to process ECC-based crypto-
graphic schemes on our computer. Generally speaking, messages should
be encrypted and attached a digital signature before it is sent to the next
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node. The receiver checks the correctness of the signature, decrypts the
ciphertext to process the message if receives a new message. Therefore,
the traditional network needs 4 encryption, signings, verification and de-
cryption to finish one CRL distribution process, overall costs 11.4482 mil-
liseconds, while the Blockchain based scheme only requires half of the
efforts (5.7241 ms).
TABLE 6.2: Average Processing Time
Cryptography Scheme Processing Time (milliseconds)
ECIES Encryption 0.51027
ECIES Decryption 0.73996
ECDSA Signing 0.51001
ECDSA Verifying 1.20603
6.2.4 Revoked Certificate Reallocation
The purpose of blockchain based pseudonym certificate management
system is to reduce the cost of certificate generation and management.
The proposed scheme could not only reduce the size of CRL and commu-
nication overhead, but also reuse revoked pseudonym certificates due to
the shuffling mechanism. Traditional certificate revocation schemes rec-
ommend to withdraw certificates from malicious users and remove all
related certificates from system, while the proposed scheme is dedicated
to not waste certificates. With the nature of shuffling system, the revoked
certificates could be collected and re-distributed to other areas.
In the proposed scheme, malicious vehicles will be withdrawn all
given related certificates and certificate revocation list will be broadcasted
in its area and surrounding neighbour areas for a fixed of time duration.
Chapter 6. Distributed Pseudonym Certificate Revocation Scheme for
VCS Using Distributed Digital Ledger
123
Because of the CRL, all road users within the network know that mes-
sages sent from certificates in CRL are not trusted. In addition to the
certain geographical CRL distribution, the communication overhead is
much less compared with conventional broadcast CRL to every single
nodes in the network. So this mechanism could prevent malicious vehi-
cles from launching attacks on road users. Even malicious vehicles want
to travel to different locations to continue attack, adjacent area privacy
managers knows their movement beforehand once they try to request
new pseudonym certificates. Otherwise, malicious vehicles have no valid
certificates to use in the communication network.
Each certificate in the certificate revocation list has the expire time.
After the expire time, these certificates will be collected and removed
from CRL by PKI. PKI waits for the next available time for shuffling, and
uploads these certificates to the blockchain network. Because of the shuf-
fling mechanism, all shuffling certificates will not be distributed back to
transaction sender, which means these certificates will not be sent back to
the same privacy manager and area where it was from before certificates
got revoked. As a result, revoked pseudonym certificates can be treated
as fresh pseudonym and used again in different areas. In the mean time,
PKI keeps fully record about the movement of these pseudonym certifi-
cates.
6.3 Summary
To summary, this chapter introduced a blockchain based certificate revo-
cation scheme in order to prevent from insider attacks in VCS and reduce
the communication overhead. The proposed scheme used blockchain
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technique to provide a distributed and decentralised certificate manage-
ment system that inherited from the pseudonym management system in
Chapter 5. As a result, the proposed system allows PKI to have a timely
update mapping table to track the ownership of every pseudonym set
and to distribute in an efficient manner. Based on the total processing
time, updating mapping table can be operated in every 5 seconds. In ad-
dition, an efficient accountability report mechanism is embed with other
message service to minimise communication overhead. Two levels in
VCS have been discussed, infrastructure level and vehicle level respec-
tively. The CRL size has been studied compared with original X.509 and
optimised version of X.509. The results show that the blockchain based
scheme is able to efficiently compress the size of CRL, resulting almost
12.5 % CRL size of conventional X.509. Secondly, the Blockchain based
certificate revocation scheme reduces one-third of the message overheads
comparing to the X.509 based schemes among the infrastructure level.
Since the blockchain structure provides a distributed structure, the pro-
posed scheme achieves more efficiency and more robustness. The results
of message overheads between certificate revocation scheme demonstrate
the blockchain based system reduce the message communication burden
by minimising the overall number of broadcast messages.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter concludes the main contributions of the thesis. The future
work is discussed in detail after the conclusion.
7.1 Conclusion
In vehicular communication system, pseudonyms are used to preserve
identity and location privacy. This thesis investigates challenges of using
pseudonyms and presents novel solutions. The main contributions of
this research are summarised as follows:
In Chapter 4, a Cooperative Pseudonym Change scheme (CPCS) is
proposed for preserving privacy in VCS. In CPCS, it takes the traditional
VCS network as system model, which CA is the central manager on top
level, RSU is acting as more than just access point and vehicles locates
on the bottom. Butterfly key expansion is used for pseudonym certificate
generation and CA would dynamically distribute pseudonyms to RSUs
based on the traffic flow of different regions. The RSU plays an important
role in CPCS, which not only relays messages between CA and vehicles,
but also assists similar context vehicles to change pseudonym simulta-
neously. Vehicles have two approaches for pseudonym changing. One is
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periodically change pseudonyms from its pre-loaded pseudonym pool in
the OBU. In addition, vehicles will be required to change pseudonym in
the mix zone if they have enough surrounding neighbours. The results
of evaluation are carried out by using simulation tools OMNET++ and
Sumo. CPCS has achieved nearly 20 % more anonymity set size in light
traffic congestion compared with the benchmark. In addition, the en-
tropy, degree of anonymity and successful tracking ratio have also been
studied to get the insight of different privacy metrics evaluate privacy
preserving schemes.
In Chapter 5, a Decentralised Pseudonym Management System (DPMS)
using distributed digital ledger is proposed for recycling pseudonym
certificates in VCS. Since Chapter 4 provides a solution of pseudonym
changing in vehicles, the problem of mass pseudonym certificates pro-
duction still remains. Especially, the proposed method needs a large
amount of pseudonym in total. In order to alleviate the communication
burden, DPMS has adopted the traditional VCS system model by intro-
ducing privacy managers (PM) and placing them between CA and RSU.
Unlike the traditional VCS network system, CA in DPMS only involves
at the registration stage and when malicious behaviours occur, and PM
network manages pseudonym certificates most of the time. To ease the
difficulty in managing millions of pseudonym certificates, DPMS has
included the consensus mechanism of blockchain to provide fully ran-
dom and distributed pseudonym shuffling so that all pseudonyms can
be reused. In addition, the blockchain technique also provides more ro-
bustness and resilience for the decentralised and distributed system. As a
result, the adopted private blockchain system has achieved cost-efficient
pseudonym management. Furthermore, DPMS extends the function of
CPCS by adding the virtual mix zone to provide more places for vehicles
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changing pseudonyms. For the results evaluation, Chapter 5 discussed
several types of vehicle privacy attacks and defence measures that are en-
abled by our proposed blockchain-based system. Meanwhile the simu-
lated pseudonym reuse frequency, total amount of pseudonym consump-
tion and delivery rate corroborate that our proposed scheme can be used
in connected vehicular networks and that it could significantly reduce the
cost of pseudonym related generation and maintenance of credentials.
The total pseudonym usage for 3 days of the proposed scheme could
save nearly 90 % compared with ESTI recommended standards. In ad-
dition, a total process time is computed which shows that our scheme is
capable of performing pseudonym shuffling with over 1, 000 blockchain
transactions in 2 seconds.
In Chapter 6, a Distributed Pseudonym Certificate Revocation Scheme
(DPCRS) is proposed as an extension for certificate management based
on previous Decentralised Pseudonym Management System. Since DPMS
system provides a framework that pseudonym certificates shuffling mech-
anism, DPCRS proposes a novel certificate revocation system to prevent
from insider attacks and reduce the communication overhead. The pro-
posed system allows PKI to have a timely update mapping table to track
the ownership of every pseudonym set and to distribute in an efficient
manner. In addition, an efficient accountability report mechanism is em-
bed with other message service to minimise communication overhead.
The CRL size has been studied compared with original X.509 and op-
timised version of X.509. The results show that the blockchain based
scheme is able to efficiently compress the size of CRL, resulting nearly
12.5 % CRL size of conventional X.509. Secondly, we compare the overall
message handshake procedures with traditional revocation scheme at in-
frastructure level, saving 33.3 % message overheads. Since the blockchain
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structure provides a distributed structure, the proposed scheme achieves
more efficiency and more robustness. Finally, we discussed the system
could release all the revoked pseudonym certificates back to the network
using shuffle mechanism so it could save the cost of pseudonym certifi-
cate generation and minimise the difficulty of certificate management.
7.2 Future Work
In this thesis, a distributed and decentralised pseudonym certificate man-
agement system is proposed for vehicular network system. The possible
research and experimental studies which can be carried out in the future
are discussed below.
7.2.1 Implementation of Proposed Schemes in Real Testbed
In addition to the simulation performance, the measurable benefits of
the pseudonym management system could be evaluating on a real 5G
testbed. Since current VCS devices (e.g. Cohda units) not only provide
DSRC service but also cellular communication, it is possible to build up
the real system based on Cohda Wireless units (which are OBUs and
RSUs made from one of the leading connect vehicles technology com-
panies) and compare performance using different communication tech-
nologies.
7.2.2 Inter-working Between PKIs for Certificate Management
The work in the thesis focuses on a system that only has one central au-
thority and public key infrastructure. For instance, in the UK, the Driver
Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) could be CA and a certificate issue de-
partment could be PKI. To extend the scale of the work, the proposed
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scheme can work among different countries. European Union currently
has 28 countries and EU can be a good scenario for the extended work.
Since different countries have different transportation laws and regula-
tions, countries are supposed to have their own blockchain based certifi-
cate management system. However, EU citizens and vehicles frequently
cross border between countries. Without an agreed management system
for EU, the VCS is not even secure and safe to apply. In this case, a novel
blockchain architecture, sidechains, could solve this problem. Sidechains
is a type of discrete Blockchain, which is linked to the main Blockchain.
Each sidechain runs with miners and a complete blockchain network. For
EU countries, each country can have a sidechain based certificate man-
agement system. And EU holds a main blockchain that runs by all par-
ticipated members. So that credentials and cryptographic materials of
vehicles can be transferred from one sidechain to another sidechain via
the main blockchain system.
7.2.3 Migration of Proposed Schemes to Internet of Things Sys-
tem
The smart grid is a revolutionary upgrade to the existing power grid. It
is an important part of Internet of Things. Smart grid will have com-
plex networks of intelligent electronic devices, distributed generators,
and dispersed loads that require communication networks for manage-
ment and coordination. The primary security requirements for the appli-
cation communications (e.g. advanced metering infrastructure) in smart
grid are identity and message authentication, message integrity, non-
repudiation, accountability, and access control. Pseudonym and certifi-
cate will play crucial roles in terms of security and privacy protection.
It would be interesting to see how the proposed pseudonym certificate
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management system can be implemented in the smart grid and even in
other IoT scenarios. Because the cost of certificate generation and man-
agement in IoT environment could be much higher than VCS due to the
nature of a large amount of nodes participating in IoT.
7.2.4 Decentralised AI for Intelligent Transportation Sytem
The concept of decentralised AI has been recently emerging. Decen-
tralised AI is basically a combination of AI and blockchain. The decen-
tralised AI enables to process and perform analytic or decision making on
trusted, digitally signed, and secure shared data that has been transacted
and stored on the blockchain, in a distributed and decentralised fashion,
without Trusted Third Parties or intermediaries. Digital twins, one of the
leading applications in combining AI and benefits of using blockchain,
aims to translate data and intelligence from complex physical systems
into application’s and simulations in digital world. It is interesting to
implement the proposed system with Cohda Wireless units into digital
twins and observe the consequence of different types of security and pri-
vacy attacks.
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Appendix A
A Brief Introduction of
OMNeT++
This appendix states a brief introduction of OMNeT++ network simula-
tor. The graphical user interface is illustrated in the the figure A.1. The
structure of the node module in OMNeT++ is shown in figure A.2. Fig-
ure A.3 illustrates the parameter configuration of the entire simulation.
The simulation interface is demonstrated in figure A.4. In figure A.1, the
FIGURE A.1: The graphical user interface
project can be selected at the left side of the graphical user interface. The
code of the simulation and algorithm can be edited at the main window
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of this simulator. The compile process and messages are shown at the
bottom of the graphical user interface. In figure A.2, the module struc-
FIGURE A.2: The structure of the node module
ture of the privacy manager includes an application layer module, two
lower layer module which connect to the road side unit and other infras-
tructures. The mobility module is used to control the position of privacy
manager. In figure A.3, the main configuration allows user to edit the
FIGURE A.3: The parameter configuration of the simula-
tion
parameters of this simulation, for instance, the amount of vehicles and
RSUs, transmit power, the size of simulation area and the position of all
nodes etc.. Figure A.4 shows the simulation interface. The topology of
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FIGURE A.4: The simulation interface
the scenario is placed at the main window. The top of the window shows
the timeline of the ongoing events. The bottom left corner presents all
the nodes. Message transmission and vehicle status are recorded in the
bottom.
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